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This study aimed to investigate a way to a sustainable future of Newfoundland and 
Labrador through the introduction of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) using the province’s 
oil and gas resources. The theoretical frameworks for this study are the capital approach of 
weak sustainability, environmental justice, and resource curse. With these frameworks, a 
comparative case study analysis has been adopted to investigate cases of two jurisdictions 
that are already successfully operating SWFs funded by oil and gas revenue to build more 
sustainable societies by sustaining their economic, environmental, human, and social 
capitals. Based on the case studies, this feasibility study examined the following questions: 
1) What impacts did the Norwegian SWF have on the sustainability of Norway? 2) What 
impacts did the Alaskan SWF have on the sustainability of Alaska? 3) How does the oil 
and gas industry affect Newfoundland and Labrador's sustainability and what 
improvements should be made? 4) Will Newfoundland and Labrador be able to ensure 
sustainability with their oil and gas revenue? The study concludes that introducing a SWF 
could help to ensure the sustainability of Newfoundland and Labrador, with several 
supporting policies, such as diversified funding sources, building a framework that can 






This study aimed to investigate a way to a sustainable future of Newfoundland and 
Labrador through the introduction of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) that is collected from 
non-renewable resources revenues and is managed by the provincial government. The cases 
of Norway and Alaska that are already successfully operating SWFs are investigated and 
are compared using SWOT analyses to draw lessons for Newfoundland and Labrador's 
sustainability. The study uses as theoretical frameworks the concepts of sustainability and 
environmental justice. It concludes that introducing a SWF could help ensure the 
sustainable development of Newfoundland and Labrador, economically, socially and 
environmentally. Several supporting policies are recommended, such as diversified funding 
sources for the proposed SWF, building a framework that can effectively benefit local 
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The oil and gas industry is an important component of Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
economy. The oil and gas industry yielded about 21% of the province's industrial gross 
output in 2016, and this contribution is a larger contribution then even manufacturing 
industry in Newfoundland and Labrador (Statistics Canada, 2020). The dependency, 
however, has been a double-edged sword for the economy of Newfoundland and Labrador. 
When oil price was high, Newfoundland and Labrador has experienced economic growth 
with more employment and fiscal benefits; however, the economic boom brought by oil 
can rapidly come to an end (Palladini, 2015; Seth Kwei, 2019). On the other hand, when 
oil price is low, just as the current low oil price since mid-2010s, Newfoundland and 
Labrador experienced huge losses of welfare and economic downturn (Carbone & 
McKenzie, 2016). In 2008, the contribution to GDP of the oil and gas industry reached its 
highest level with $11.7 billion, however, it decreased to $4.7 billion in 2017 with the 
slumping oil price that began late in 2014 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
2009, 2019c). Newfoundland and Labrador is now one of Canada's most economically 
challenged provinces. The province is experiencing the greatest decrease of the number of 
young labour force since 2012, and the unemployment rate was 13.8% in 2018 which was 
much higher than the national unemployment rate of 5.8% (Government of Canada, 2020). 
The provincial government’s debt hit the record high with $15.4 billion in 2019 (Auditor 




The future of the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador seems to be not great 
either. The Carbon Tracker, an independent financial think tank, asserted that there will be 
low demand for oil and gas resources from Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore because 
of the increasing risk of climate change and its higher production cost on Newfoundland 
and Labrador’s offshore than its production cost on other offshores (Atlantic Business, 
2019). Also, the oil price trend is not helpful either. Recently, the United States Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) has insisted that the oil price will not be recovered in a 
short-term as they predict that the annual average price of Brent crude oil, which is a 
benchmark for Newfoundland and Labrador oil, will be $34.14/barrel in 2020 and 
$47.81/barrel in 2021 which is significantly lower than its price of $64.37 in 2019 (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2020b). Without any significant changes in policies 
for their oil and gas resources, the future of Newfoundland and Labrador is seems to be 
downfall.  
 
Meanwhile, in 2018, the provincial government  of Newfoundland and Labrador unveiled 
a plan named “the Way Forward” that included plans to drill over 100 new exploration 
wells and double its oil production by 2030 (Oil and Gas Industry Development Council, 
2018). Therefore, aside from the plan to increase oil and gas production, Newfoundland 
and Labrador needs to figure out how to make the benefits from the oil and gas industry 
sustainable, even when there is a downturn in the global oil market or when its oil and gas 




From this awareness, this study aims to search for a way to a sustainable future of 
Newfoundland and Labrador using their oil and gas resources, with an assumption that the 
oil price will stabilize again after the Covid-19 outbreak is over and economies start 
working again. In other words, how benefits from oil and gas resources should be 
distributed between the oil and gas companies and the province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador to sustain the benefits of oil and gas resources and keep the benefits at a 
sustainable level is a major concern of this study. The ideal way of benefit distribution from 
oil and gas resources in this study is a “fair distribution” which is considered as a condition 
for sustainability (Alshuwaikhat & Mohammed, 2017; Van de Kerk & Manuel, 2008). 
There are two aspects of fair distribution, which are inter-generational fair distribution and 
intra-generational fair distribution (Lamorgese, 2014; Warhurst Alyson, 2002). Inter-
generational fair distribution refers to a fair distribution between succeeding generations 
(Warhurst Alyson, 2002). Intra-generational fair distribution refers to a fair distribution of 
resources within the current generation, such as between oil companies and local people 
(Elliott, 2005; Lamorgese, 2014). The fairness does not only mean economic fairness, but 
it includes social and environmental fairness also.  
 
To distribute the benefits of resources fairly, a fund-based approach is frequently used in 
non-renewable resource sectors (Atkinson & Pearce, 1993; Hite, 2015). Under the fund 
approach, the government accumulates a significant amount of financial assets through oil 
production, which can be used and invested to satisfy the needs of the current and the future 
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generations. Fund-based approaches facilitate a fair distribution of benefits to the public 
from extractive industries that utilize non-renewable natural resources, as they involve 
dispersing cash benefits for specific purposes (Hite, 2015). When the government owns a 
fund with investment strategies for macroeconomic policy purposes, the fund is generally 
called a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) (Alhashel, 2015; Das & Lu, 2009; Beck & Fidora, 
2008). SWFs are usually sourced from commodity export revenues, and they aims to 
stabilize government and export revenues, accumulate savings for future generations, and 
manage foreign reserves (Alhashel, 2015). 
 
1.2 Research Background: Oil and Gas Industry in Newfoundland and Labrador  
The first exploration oil well in Newfoundland and Labrador was drilled in 1966 on the 
east coast. The economic viability, however, was not enough to begin commercial 
production of oil because there were many other oil fields globally capable of cheaper and 
easier production (Fusco, 2007). The situation changed dramatically after the first global 
oil crisis in 1973. With the surge of oil prices in 1973, interest in the oil resources of 
Newfoundland and Labrador started to rise significantly (Fusco, 2007).  
 
Canada commenced negotiations on the continental shelf boundary at the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) conference in July 1970 and established a 
200-nautical-mile off shore fishery zone in 1977, which was agreed to in 1982 (Esearch, 
2019; Miller, 2007). It confirmed Canada’s authority over the development of the oil and 
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gas resources on the Grand Banks (Esearch, 2019), but without defining jurisdictional 
control of the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador. The province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador has tried to claim jurisdictional control over its territorial sea 
and continental shelf (Fitzgerald, 1991). The province of Newfoundland and Labrador 
outlined an approach to develop their offshore resources in a government White Paper in 
1977, which was to include:   
1) A system of exploration and development permits for the lands claimed by 
Newfoundland and Labrador which ensures that work is actually done by permit 
holders; 2) Development and production of the resource in a reasonable time-frame 
consistent with other objectives (rather than leaving the resource unexplored and 
underdeveloped); 3) Maximization of the economic rents to be earned from the 
resource for the public sector; 4) Control of the rate of development to ensure 
maximized benefits and minimum disruptive impacts; 5) Environmental protection, 
with particular concern to protect the fishery; 6) Participation and involvement of 
residents of the province in planning offshore development. (Voyer, 1983, p.38).  
 
On October 24, 1977, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador enacted offshore 
petroleum regulations that includes the following provisions:  
1) preference for Newfoundland labor, goods, and services, 2) compulsory training, 
research, and development programs in the province, 3) the landing in the province 
of any oil and gas produced offshore, 4) minimum expenditures within the province, 
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5) preference for local refining, processing, and consumption of oil and gas, and 6) 
provincial control over the rate of development. (Fitzgerald, 1991, p.6) 
In 1979, the first major oil field in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore was discovered 
at Hibernia on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland and Labrador. Both the provincial 
government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the federal government of Canada 
recognized the oil field as an important part of its energy strategy (Fusco, 2007). After years 
of negotiation between the federal government and the provincial government, they 
established a joint management system called the “Atlantic Accord” for Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s offshore, recognizing the priority of the province, and created the Canada-
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) to manage the 
offshore on behalf of both governments in 1985 (Fusco, 2007). The Atlantic Accord in 
1985 aimed “to provide resource revenues to Newfoundland and Labrador as well as 
Canada, the attainment of national self-sufficiency and security of supply, and a stable and 
fair offshore management regime to the oil and gas industry” (Government of 





Figure 1. Location of Major Oil Fields, Offshore Newfoundland, Eastern Canada. 
Reprinted from “Reservoir connectivity analysis of a complex combination trap: Terra 
Nova Field, Jeanne d'Arc Basin, Newfoundland, Canada”, by Richards, F. W., Vrolijk, P. 
J., Gordon, J. D., Miller, B. R. 2010, Geological Society Special Publication, 347,  p.334 
 
After the discovery of the Hibernia oil field, the Hebron oil field was discovered in 1980, 
then the Terra Nova and White Rose oil fields were discovered in 1984. The production of 
crude oil from the Hibernia oil field, however, was not started until 1997 because of the 
declined oil price, a prolonged development process, engineering problems, and the 
increasing price tag of the project due to those delays (Fusco, 2007). After a long-awaited 
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process of development, Hibernia crude oil production started in 1997, and the oil and gas 
industry has become a more important basic industry than the fishing industry that was 
declining due to resource depletion (Coulombe, 2012). After the first crude oil production, 
Terra Nova crude oil production began in 2002, and White Rose oil production began in 
2005 (Bott, 2004).  
 
According to the Oil and Gas Industry Development Council (2018), Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s offshore has 2.2 Billion Barrels (BBbls) of discovered oil reserves left and 12.6 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas discovered which needs to be developed. It is also estimated 
that there is 37.5 BBbls of oil and 133.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas undiscovered in 
the West Orphan and Flemish Pass regions (Oil and Gas Industry Development Council, 
2018). So far, the total amount of oil already produced in the Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
offshore is about 1.7 BBbls. Based on the “Way Forward” plan, the province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador plans to drill over 100 new exploration wells, and increase 
the daily production to over 650,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d) by 2030.  That 
is more than twice the current daily production. Other than these plans, the “Way Forward” 
plan includes long-term plans of starting commercial natural gas production, growing the 
supply and service industry, and creating a world-class energy cluster (Oil and Gas Industry 




Despite such positive forecasts, the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador is 
undergoing hard times with the falling crude oil price started in late 2014. The price of 
Brent crude oil, which is a benchmark for Newfoundland and Labrador oil,  was at 
US$105.79 in July 2014, however, it dropped to US$ 59.29/barrel in December 2014 (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2020b). Since then, the average annual crude oil price 
was US$48.66/barrel in 2015, US$43.29/barrel in 2016, US$50.80/barrel in 2017, 
US$65.23/barrel in 2018, and US$57.00/barrel in 2019 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2020b). The situation got much worse in 2020. As tensions between Russia 
and Saudi Arabia are escalated and global oil demands are significantly reduced mainly 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the monthly oil price in April 2020 dropped to US$16.55 
and daily spot oil price once fell as low as minus $36.98/barrel (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2020b). As oil prices fell, the oil industry in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
where production costs were higher than in other oil-producing regions, has been 
significantly impacted. The planned expansion process of the oil fields in Newfoundland 
and Labrador, such as the drilling program in the Hibernia oil field and the development of 
the West White Rose oil fields, has been suspended or deferred (Graney, 2020).  
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
This study aims to investigate a way for Newfoundland and Labrador to utilize its oil and 
gas revenues to secure the sustainability of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
as announced in the “Way Forward” plan, which planned to increase oil and gas production. 
This study assumes that the current pandemic will end and the oil price will rise again, but 
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Newfoundland and Labrador could suffer if there are no political changes to its 
management of oil and gas resources, as global crises like the current situation can come 
again at any time. As aforementioned, the current management of oil and gas resources is 
not sustainable, so to convert them into sustainable benefit streams, which include 
environmental and social benefits as well as economic benefits, it is necessary to create a 
sizable fund and transfer the oil and gas revenues to the fund. There are two cases that have 
successfully done this, which are found in Norway and Alaska.  
 
Norway and Alaska are both considered as good examples of jurisdictions that have created 
and managed SWFs successfully with their rich oil and gas endowments. Norway has the 
world’s largest SWF which was about 1,148 billion USD in 2019 (Norges Bank Investment 
Management, 2019a), and Alaska has the largest SWF amongst any territorial entity within 
a country, which was about 66 billion USD in 2019 (Center for the Governance of Change, 
2020). Although there is a difference between Norway and NL, as Norway is a country and 
NL is a province in Canada, the considerations for a provincial fiscal policy are not much 
different from those for a national fiscal policy, as they are mainly a matter of economic 
variables, for instance, the size of the economy, the unemployment rate, and the debt 
capacity (Barber, 1968). The characteristics of different SWFs are determined by their 
objectives, such as stabilizing the economy, saving for a pension, or long-term development 
of the domestic economy (International Monetary Fund, 2008), and they are already widely 
and internationally adopted in many countries and provinces (states) regardless of the size 




While Norway’s Alaska’s present good examples of SWFs, their primary way of spending 
the fund is different. While Norway’s SWF’s focus is to save the fund and finance future 
liabilities, Alaska’s SWF has a unique fund dividend system which provides a basic income 
for their residents. Alaska is the one US state that has a significantly lower poverty rate of 
10.2% than the national average of 14.6%, thanks to the SWF funded by oil and gas revenue 
(Welfareinfo, 2017). Therefore, the SWFs of Norway and Alaska will be discussed as 
benchmarks for oil wealth distribution and investment, using oil and gas revenues (Murphy 
& Clemens, 2013; Olawuyi & Onifade, 2018; Truman, 2009). Here, the distribution and 
investment of oil wealth means a stock of assets that includes economic, environmental, 
human, and social capitals to build sustainable society. What NL needs is to get the 
continued benefits from their oil and gas resources to sustain the development of the 
province as well as their environmental, human, and social capitals, not just gaining 
temporary economic benefits the way they have done so far. Thus, this study examines 
whether lessons from SWF frameworks can be applied to NL, based on the case studies of 
Norway and Alaska, to investigate a way for NL  to utilize oil and gas income to secure the 
province’s sustainability. To achieve this research goal, the study aims to address four 
objectives and research questions: 
1) The Norwegian SWF and the sustainability of Norway: What impacts did the 
Norwegian SWF have on the sustainability of Norway? 
2) The Alaskan SWF and the sustainability of Alaska: What impacts did the Alaskan 
SWF have on the sustainability of Alaska? 
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3) The oil and gas industry and the sustainability of Newfoundland and Labrador: How 
does the oil and gas industry affect NL’s sustainability and what improvements 
should be made?  
4) The feasibility of the introduction of a SWF in NL and identify the challenges based 
on the case study results of Norway and Alaska: Will NL be able to ensure 
sustainability like Norway and Alaska with their oil and gas revenue? 
Norway and Alaska are cases to demonstrate that SWF is an instrument that has the 
potential to maintain sustainability and achieve a fair distribution of wealth by using non-
renewable resources. By examining the factors that led to the success of Norway and Alaska, 
this study intends to argue that it is feasible for NL to achieve sustainability through the 
introduction of a SWF using the oil and gas resources in the province, after the Covid-19 
outbreak is over and economies start working again, with an assumption that the provincial 
government of NL has the political will for a sustainable future for the province.  
 
1.4 Overview of This Study 
This study consists of seven chapters. This first chapter provides the background and 
objectives of this study, to explain the rationale of this research. Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review that covers concepts and theories which are conceptual frameworks for 
this study. The concepts and theories in this chapter explain what factors should be 
reviewed to investigate sustainability issues related to the fair distribution of oil and gas 
revenues. Chapter 3 provides a research methodology and outlines the research design. 
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Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide the case studies of Norway and Alaska. These chapters 
investigate the background of how Norway and Alaska created their SWF frameworks; the 
impacts of the SWFs on the sustainability of their societies; and compare the results of the 
case studies to provide implications for NL. On the basis of these results, Chapter 6 
investigates a way for NL to utilize its oil and gas revenue to secure their sustainability and 
discusses its feasibility and challenges. Lastly, Chapter 7 provides a summary and 
conclusion of this study, and outlines some policy recommendations aimed to ensure the 
sustainability of NL. It also discusses the limitations of the study and makes 






2. Literature Review 
  
2.1 Introduction 
The issue of distribution of wealth generated from natural resource extraction has received 
growing attention, especially when focused on non-renewable/exhaustible resource 
extraction. The wealth from non-renewable resource extraction has generated both positive 
and negative effects on the sustainability of a society that relies for its development on non-
renewable resources. To discuss how to fairly distribute the wealth generated from natural 
resource extraction, the concepts related to those effects on sustainability need to be 
investigated.   
 
The revenue from non-renewable resources exploitation needs to be managed carefully to 
assist in achieving the sustainability of a society. The natural resources are key inputs for 
sustainable development; however, the nature of non-renewable resources inevitably raises 
concerns on the issues of sustainability. The first reason is that natural resource abundance 
is not always considered a blessing which guarantees high economic growth due to the so-
called “resource curse” (Sachs & Warner, 1997, 2001). The second reason is that the 
development using the revenue from non-renewable resources raises concerns on global 
environmental justice, which refers to justice in terms of cross-border distribution of 
environmental burdens and benefits because the cost of development can be imposed on 
the group who does not benefit from the development (Blake, 2011). The revenue from 
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non-renewable resources should be managed for minimizing these impacts. A SWF is one 
type of financial instrument to manage the revenue from non-renewable resources towards 
sustainable outcomes, as it is largely motivated by the need for ensuring the stability and 
security of a nation (Sun et al., 2014). This study considers creating a SWF for the province 
of NL in Canada as a way to reduce the aforementioned problems of development using 
non-renewable resources, because a SWF can be used to convert oil and gas revenue into 
financial capital that can be invested for the public good. 
 
This chapter will examine the concepts related to the distribution of oil and gas revenues, 
as they are presented in the existing literature. The literature examined in this section 
includes peer-reviewed papers, reports from think tank institutions, international 
organizations, and theses. Those literatures published cover publications mostly from 1990 
to 2019 with several exceptions of those published in 1980s and 1970s. Several themes can 
be identified in the literature, which are: 1) the difference between the concepts of wealth 
and revenue, and how they can be used to achieve sustainability of a society; 2) how 
sustainability in a society can be accomplished with non-renewable resource revenue; 3) 
what a SWF is and why it is important when it comes to the fair distribution of oil and gas 





2.2 Wealth and Sustainability 
The emergence of the concept of wealth is related to the concerns about sustainability and 
the struggle to overcome the limitations of traditional macroeconomic variables, such as 
gross domestic product (GDP). The ultimate goal of this study is to figure out how to make 
the NL province benefit from its oil revenue not only for the future generations but also for 
the current generation by attaining sustainable socio-economic outcomes using their oil and 
gas resources. This is in line with the classical definition of sustainable development from 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report of 1987 that 
states: “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 16). Considering this concept of sustainable 
development, sustainability in this study can be defined as preserving the level of well-
being over time with the capacity to sustain the well-being for the future generations as 
well as for the current generation at the same level (Vivien, 2018). GDP cannot measure 
sustainability since it measures only current income and production of goods and services 
without considering the assets for long term development (The World Bank, 2018). For 
example, GDP can be boosted by over-exploiting natural resources, however, this process 
lowers the opportunity of future production capacity. Sustainability is about sustaining and 
enhancing the opportunities available to both current and future people in society, and the 
opportunities depend on the accumulation of wealth (Weitzman, 2016) not only on GDP 
growth. Wealth in this study is considered a stock of assets including all tangible and 
intangible assets an economy has minus its liabilities, while income is considered a flow 
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which measures the amount of money (or goods) that is obtained over a given interval of 
time and gets added to the stock of wealth. Therefore, the level of GDP cannot be equated 
with the level of well-being in a society, and the policy decisions based on only traditional 
economic indicators lead to poor decisions without full information. To address the well-
being of society, inspecting the level of various capital stocks used jointly to produce well-
being over time is considered a coherent approach (Uwasu & Yabar, 2011).  
 
Early studies on sustainable development, such as Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977),  
theoretically presented that economic growth can be sustained when earlier generations 
draw down the finite pool of non-renewable natural resources optimally and they add 
optimally to the stock of reproducible capital. The reproducible capital refers to man-made 
capital such as machines, which is considered as compensation for non-renewable 
resources used (Hediger, 1997). According to Solow (1974), the proportional rate of change 
of the marginal productivity of the resource should always equal the level of the marginal 
productivity of reproducible capital to be on the optimal path of development. The approach 
to measuring the sustainability of society by estimating these capitals is called the "Capital 
approach". The significance of the capital approach is that the stock of capitals is considered 
to give the capacity to grow the stream of goods and services in the society (Ekins et al., 
2003)., and the stock of capitals should be non-decreasing. Atkinson and Pearce (1993) 
provided a crystallized explanation of the capital approach to sustainability in the early 
stage. In the capital approach, the amount of goods and services produced in society is 
linked to the level of various types of capital existent in the society which is used for the 
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production process. The amount of these capitals is used to estimate the level of wealth. 
Atkinson and Pearce (1993) assumed that there are 2 types of capital, which are man-made 
capital and natural capital, and they can be substituted each by the other. Atkinson and 
Pearce (1993) assert that an economy is sustainable if the economy saves more than the 
combined depreciation of the capitals. This is referred to as a weak sustainability rule. 
According to the study, the value of saving in a society, which is the potential source for 
future investment, must be larger than the summation of the value of depreciation of man-
made capital and the value of depreciation of natural capital to maintain the weak 
sustainability of a society. On the strong sustainability rule, there is a critical quantity of 
natural capital (resources) that must be maintained intact if the well-bring of the future 
generation is not to decline, which implies the non-substitution of man-made capital for 
natural capital (Hamilton, 1995).  
 
Based on these works, many studies introduce the concept of wealth as an indicator of the 
sustainability of the national economy. A theoretical concept of wealth relating to economic 
theory is the present value of future consumption which is dependent on amount of capitals 
in a society (The World Bank, 2006, 2011, 2018). Hence, the estimates of wealth can 
provide a useful indicator of the sustainability of society as the amount of wealth is founded 
on the amount of capitals that future generations can consume (The World Bank, 2018). If 
the wealth was distributed unfairly, the sustainability of the economy cannot be achieved. 
Unfair wealth means wealth that is immediately gained owing to consuming the private or 
public wealth already saved up by others (Savin & Rovenskaya, 2011). Since wealth is 
19 
 
about the sustainable growth of a society, unfair wealth can decline the sustainability and 
living conditions of the public. Chang (2012) mentioned that social relationships regarding 
resource allocation among people are also important and there will be no efficiency without 
a fair distribution of wealth. Therefore, there should be a policy instrument to make an 
unfair wealth distribution fair in order to sustain well-being in a society.  
 
The significant linkages between wealth and sustainability have noticed by a series of 
papers since the 1990s, such as the World Bank (1997), Hamilton and Clemens (1999), and 
Dasgupta and Mäler (2000). The World Bank (1997) report explores indicators of 
environmentally sustainable development that include the links between environmental 
quality and economic growth and between the consumption of resources and the quality of 
the resource stock. The focal point of this report is that “economic growth that causes rapid 
resource depletion, degradation, major health problems and productivity impacts on the 
public is neither sustainable nor desirable” (The World Bank, 1997, p. 11). This is 
worthwhile to mention because it notes that the impact of economic growth on human as 
well as resource depletion and degradation has an important impact on creating wealth. 
Hamilton and Clemens (1999), motivated by the World Bank (1997) report, developed the 
theory of “genuine savings” which describes the relationship between the wealth account 
and resource depletion, environmental degradation, and the value of investments in human 
capital (Hamilton, 1994). They explore the connections between changes in wealth and 
changes in intergenerational well-being. The rationale of considering “genuine savings” as 
an indicator for national wealth is “the incomplete treatment of resource issues” within the 
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system of national accounts (Hamilton & Bolt, 2007. p. 292). For example, commercial 
natural capital stocks are measured in the national accounts, but there is no adjustment to 
reflect the consumption of capital when these stocks are decrease as they are exploited 
(Hamilton & Bolt, 2007). When the depletion of natural capital is ignored within national 
accounts, it brings unsustainability of the country, as the depletion may be harmful for 
future generations. The measurement of genuine savings takes into account the depletion 
of natural assets that is calculated as a rental rate on commercial resource production plus 
global damages from CO2 emissions to valuate wealth. This makes the sustainability of 
natural capital an important factor when measuring wealth using the concept of genuine 
savings. This is important since the over-exploitation of natural resources without 
considering the sustainability leads to declines in economic growth and social welfare 
(Lampert, 2019). Based on this deliberation, the World Bank has published national 
“genuine savings” estimates in their reports, annually. The genuine savings measurement 
encompasses physical, human and natural capital based on weak sustainability, which is 
premised on substitutability between physical, natural and human capital (Pillarisetti, 2005). 
Therefore, one of the policy implications of the theory of genuine savings is that negative 
rates of genuine savings lead to declining well-being; however, policymakers can make 
achievable interventions to increase sustainability based on this relationship (Hamilton & 
Clemens, 1999). Hamilton et al. (2006) extended the findings of Hamilton and Clemens 
(1999) to analyze the role of the management of wealth through saving and investments. 
Their emphasis on saving is a core aspect of development as there is no way for countries 
to escape poverty without making a surplus for investment. Arrow et al. (2010) extended 
the theory of genuine savings to provide a consistent framework that incorporates 
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population growth, technological change, human capital, and environmental quality. Also, 
they incorporated the effects of expected capital gains in natural resource stocks and health 
as a kind of capital within their model.  
 
In June 2012, the United Nations University's International Human Dimensions 
Programme on Global Environmental Change (UNU-IHDP) and the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP), a biennial series of reports on the sustainability and 
wealth of countries at the Earth Summit 2012 (Rio+20). UNU-IHDP and UNEP (2012) 
discussed the construction of the wealth accounts, proposing the concept of the Inclusive 
Wealth Index (IWI). This index provides quantitative information on human well-being 
and measures of sustainability on a long-term perspective. There are a few differences 
between “genuine savings” and IWI in terms of how to calculate the level of capitals and 
sustainability, but the IWI also offers a capital approach to sustainability considering 
natural capital, produced capital, human capital, and social capital and measures the social 
value of capital assets of nations. The value of natural capital is measured based on 
everything in nature capable of providing human beings with well-being, such as fossil 
fuels, forest resources, agricultural land, and fisheries (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014; 
UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 2012). The value of produced capital is measured based on 
equipment, roads, buildings, machinery, and others which are usually accumulated from 
the investment of national income (UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 2014; UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 
2012). The value of human capital is measured based on the knowledge, skills, 
competencies, and attributes embodied in individuals, such as population size, life 
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expectancy, mortality probability, employment, educational attainment, employment 
compensation, and labor force (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014; UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 2012). 
The value of social capital is measured based on the social relationships and institutions 
that facilitate action, in terms of the importance of obligations and expectations, 
information channels (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014; UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 2012). And 
each capital category embeds intangible asset, which is hard to be quantified, in order to 
capture as much wealth as possible within the categories. IWI is considered as a stand-out 
indicator of sustainability and well-being as it  has a theoretical foundation from economics 
and can give policy implications to decide where to invest to increase the level of 
sustainability in a society (Ikeda et al., 2017; Roman & Thiry, 2016). The UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP (2012) reports, which is the first series of reports that utilize IWI to address national 
sustainability, have specified several lessons of the IWI on the policy making considering 
the sustainability of the nations. Firstly, The IWI assumes that capitals can be substitutes 
for each other. Therefore, under the inclusive wealth framework, the reason why natural 
capital is preserved is not only because natural capital needs to be preserved, but also 
because the natural capital can be converted to other forms of capital to achieve sustainable 
development. The possible substitution between capitals apply to other capitals, too. This 
assumption is criticized by other studies due to the limited substitutability between capitals, 
especially because natural capital cannot or should not be substituted (Bailey, 2017; Cohen 
et al., 2018; Ekins et al., 2003). Second, as a part of measuring natural capital, UNU-IHDP 
and UNEP (2012) bring up the interconnected externalities of global environmental issues. 
The reports especially point out climate change as an important transboundary threat on 
inclusive wealth while there are other issues such as biodiversity loss and loss of fisheries. 
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The third is the shadow price of capitals. The shadow price reflects the degree of 
substitution between capitals assets, intergeneration benefits by the capitals, and the 
scarcities of the capitals (UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 2012). Theoretically, a shadow price 
should be properly reflected in the market price of the capital. However, on the practice of 
sustainability study, the shadow price of capitals is problematic as those are usually not 
observable on the market, especially for natural capital, human capital, and social capital, 
in that order (UNU-IHDP & UNEP, 2012).  
 
Although there are some theoretical differences between the sustainability accounts 
proposed, sustainability of nations is about having many types of capital and how they 
might be substituted for one another over time to meet the needs of the current generations 
and of the future generations (Hamilton & Hartwick, 2014). Using these capitals more 
efficiently and increasing their productivity are crucial for sustainable economic growth 
(Sustainable Prosperity, 2014). The capital approach to sustainability has a strength that 
provides a constructive guide to policymakers to manage national wealth (Atkinson & 
Atkinson, 2008). Produced capital (human-made capital) is capital that can be used 
“repeatedly or continuously in production processes for more than one year, such as 
machinery, buildings, roads, harbours and airports and stocks of raw materials, semi-
finished and finished goods held for future sale and intangible types of goods” (Saunders 
et al., 2010, p.6). Natural capital refers to “the stock of natural ecosystems that yields a 
flow of valuable ecosystem goods or services which do not have substitutes from produced 
capital” (Maack & Davidsdottir, 2015). Human capital is regarded as “the stock of 
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economically productive human capabilities, such as knowledge, skills, competencies, and 
attributes embodied in individuals”(Saunders et al., 2010, p.7). Social capital consists of “a 
stock of trust, mutual understanding, shared values and socially held knowledge which 
impact on society’s productivity” (Maack & Davidsdottir, 2015), such as political, legal, 
and commercial institutions,  sense of community, participation, and interaction in local 
and external networks. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defines social capital as “the social norms, shared values and institutional 
arrangements that foster co-operation among population groups” (OECD, 2020, p. 234). 
The capital approach incorporates the four capitals that are relevant to sustainability 
(OECD, 2004). And aside from these capitals, some scholars include the financial capital 
in their approach for sustainability that is a liquid asset which allows interchange between 
capitals and can be invested in production activities, saved in the form of the national 
currency that is expected to rise in value, or in ownership shares (Goodwin, 2003; Maack 
& Davidsdottir, 2015). It is also used to own or control the four capitals above mentioned 
(Goodwin, 2003). 
 
2.3 Non-renewable Natural Resources and Sustainable Development 
 
According to the aforementioned discussion on sustainability, natural capital is a critical 
input for sustainable development. The inevitably finite nature of non-renewables, however, 
has raised concerns on the issues of sustainability, such as inter-generational access to these 
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resources, the environmental impacts associated with their  production and use, and the 
social impacts on local communities (Cowell et al., 2000). The publication of the Club of 
Rome’s report  in the 1970s, "The Limits to Growth", increased these concerns, as the report 
showed that exponential population growth and exhaustible resource use would lead to 
decline in the quality of life in the world (Meadows et al., 1972).  
 
However, some authors consider that there are still several ways to maintain weak 
sustainability with non-renewable natural resources with proper management of the 
resources, even though the non-renewable natural resources cannot be renewable in a 
predictable time span. Auty (2014) pointed out that sustainable development and 
harnessing of non-renewable resources are compatible if the potential environmental 
damage arising from the exploitation of non-renewable resources can be substituted with 
other natural resources. He asserted that a sufficient fraction of rent from non-renewable 
resource development must be invested to substitute for the damages. Therefore, the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources does not necessarily bring the non-sustainability 
of society. Rather, resource development can yield many benefits for sustaining weak 
sustainability. Söderholm and Svahn (2015) categorized the types of benefits from non-
renewable natural resources into monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits. The 
monetary benefits include development and investment funds, equity sharing, and tax 
sharing with governments, and the non-monetary benefits include educational facilities, 
medical facilities, employment goals, local procurement, training of staff, and improved 
service access (Söderholm & Svahn, 2015). Sequeira and Sarkar (2017) categorized the 
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types of benefits by the phase of resource development. In the short and medium run, 
communities can get benefits from local employment, opportunities for local suppliers, 
skills training, and road construction. In the long run or in the focus on sustainability, 
communities can get benefits from community development programs, the shared revenue 
stream from royalties, and livelihood activities, and these benefits are tied to investing 
companys’ profits.  
 
However, aside from the finite nature of the non-renewable natural resources, there are 
more factors that can diminish the sustainability of society. The development of oil and gas 
brings booms and busts in an economy as a part of its history (Shields, 1998). Although 
there is a lack of consensus on its causes and consequences, the “resource curse” 
phenomenon is a challenging issue for the countries exploiting oil and gas resources. 
Moreover, the fundamental problem of non-renewable natural resource use for 
sustainability is that every stage in the life cycle of a non-renewable natural resource is 
associated with activities that are potentially harmful to the environment (Shields, 1998). 
These potential harms are global in nature and thus bring concerns about global 
environmental justice. The following subsections explain these concepts. 
 
1) The “Resource Curse” 
There has been a belief that natural resources, such as oil and gas, are a blessing that lets 
countries base their development on these resources (Badeeb et al., 2017a). The belief 
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collapses in some resource-rich countries as seen from case studies such as Amuzegar 
(1982), Gelb (1988) and Auty (1990). Amuzegar (1982) has found out that increased 
dependence on petroleum in oil-rich countries brings budgetary deficits, external debt, 
unemployment, and, most importantly, declined sources of livelihood and growth 
(Amuzegar, 1982). Gelb (1988) has found that oil exporting countries experienced a more 
serious deterioration during the boom period of 1971–1983, and the cost of using oil 
windfalls offset the gains from the oil windfalls. After that, a sizable literature showing that 
natural resource abundance can be a curse has emerged since the 1980s and has increased 
over time (Badeeb et al., 2017b). The "resources curse" refers to the paradox that countries 
with great natural resources, specifically exhaustible resources, tend to grow more slowly 
than resource-poor countries (Sachs & Warner, 1997, 2001). There are several different 
explanations of why a resource curse can happen in some countries.  Explanations can be 
divided into two distinct but overlapping categories, which are, economic factors, such as 
the “Dutch disease” and price volatilities, and political factors, such as corruption and 
institutional quality (Badeeb et al., 2017c).  
 
Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) made large contributions to developing a 
model of the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon named after the decline of Dutch 
manufacturing after the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea. The “Dutch Disease” 
refers to the adverse effects on the Dutch manufacturing sector of the natural gas 
discoveries through the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate of the Dutch 
gulden (Corden, 1984) which had diminished the country’s net exports. “Dutch disease” 
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occurs when natural resource booms increase incomes and the demand for goods, and these 
increases generate inflation and appreciation of the country’s currency real exchange rate 
(Badeeb et al., 2017c). The “Dutch Disease” is likely to happen when the countries fails to 
promote a competitive manufacturing sector and depend largely on resource revenues as 
the inflow of resource revenue can appreciate the country’s currency (Li, 2013). 
Humphreys et al. (2007) pointed out another unique characteristic of resource revenue as a 
reason for the resource curse. The generation of natural resource wealth can occur 
independently of other economic processes that take place in a country (Humphreys et al., 
2007). For example, it can take place without major positive contribution to other industrial 
sectors and the participation of a large portion of the domestic labor force when they are 
operated by multinational enterprises or joint enterprises (Humphreys et al., 2007). Also, 
resource wealth tends to be repatriated rather than reinvested in the domestic economy 
(Heinrich, 2011). In this case, there are limited chances to promote domestic industries 
related to resource extractions and benefits from the extraction are unlikely to be reinvested 
for the development of the domestic economy (Heinrich, 2011).  
 
Also, resource extraction decisions  can take place quite independently of other political 
processes, when a government can access natural resource wealth without any prior 
agreement of the citizens or institutions (Humphreys et al., 2007). These distinguishing 
features of natural resource wealth use can cause the “resource curse”. Therefore, both the 
government and the companies can and should develop a scheme to ensure more effective 




Bauer (2013) brings up the volatility issues of resource revenue. Over the short to medium 
term, the volatility of resource revenue leads to “wasteful spending, poor quality 
investments, unpredictable business environments, and ultimately slow growth of relevant 
sectors” (Bauer, 2013, p.1). Over the longer term, the finite nature of oil and gas revenues 
leads to “economic depression and difficulty in scaling up public investment efficiently” 
(Bauer, 2013, p.1). Davis and Tilton (2005) point out that commodity price volatility causes 
fluctuations in government revenue and export income. Particularly, oil-exporting 
countries, such as Canada and Norway, can be negatively impacted by oil price volatility 
in terms of GDP and industrial production (Elder & Serletis, 2009; van Eyden et al., 2019; 
Wang et al., 2013). Carbone and McKenzie (2016) also found large welfare losses in the 
oil-rich provinces in Canada, such as Newfoundland and Labrador, Alberta, and New 
Brunswick, due to the oil price shock since late 2014. The province of NL has been affected 
the most amongst the provinces in terms of economic welfare and there was a 5.4% 
decrease in provincial income due to the oil price shock (Carbone & McKenzie, 2016). 
Meanwhile, Wenar (2008) pointed out the property rights issues in exploitation of natural 
resources. The companies/institutions which gain the right to sell the resources can use the 
money in a way that produces/aggravates the “resource curse”, not in a way that increases 
the wealth of the people who should be beneficiaries of the resource wealth (Wenar, 2008).  
 
Some studies suggest that political factors also may have a role in causing the resource 
curse. Gylfason (2001) found out that natural capitals in countries with low corruption 
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contribute more to increasing national wealth than natural capitals in countries with high 
corruption. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) make several points referring to why a lack of 
transparency of the government can cause a “resource curse” in the case of developing 
countries. In brief, a lack of transparency makes corruption look less risky, makes it hard 
to work with efficient people or institutions, and obstructs information which can help 
optimal decision making (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009).  
 
However, despite the considerable amount of literature that asserts an inverse relationship 
between natural resource use and economic growth, there is still no consensus on the 
existence of the “resource curse” phenomenon or what brings about a “resource curse”, as 
not all countries with abundant natural resources are economically underdeveloped 
(Badeeb et al., 2017c). Therefore, what needs to be discussed further is evidence-based 
policies to avoid the “resource curse” phenomenon, through a better distribution of  
resource wealth, using mechanisms such as funds, tax systems, royalty systems, or payment 
to citizens from resource revenue (Ross, 2015). In line with the capital approach, the 
national wealth can be sustainable when the non-renewable resources revenue is 
transformed into financial capital that can be invested in other forms of capitals to support 
sustainability (Moe et al., 2013). Therefore, in this case, the discussion on how to avoid the 
“resource curse” is about how to save financial capital and invest it in a way that can boost 




2) Global Environmental Justice 
The activities to extract, produce, and use non-renewable resources, especially fossil fuels, 
are significantly related to global climate change. Exploitation and utilization of fossil fuels 
account for 65% of the global greenhouse gas emissions contributing to global climate 
change (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Nevertheless, the real cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions is not properly priced, and implementing the policies to price 
them right is complex, especially because it requires differentiated responsibilities and 
duties between countries (Covert et al., 2016). As a consequence, climate change brings 
significant global environmental justice issues between countries, in addition to the 
significant environmental problems (Baer et al., 2000; Norgaard, 2006; Roberts, 2001; 
Schlosberg, 2013).  
 
The concept of environmental justice was theorized by Bullard (1990) with concerns about 
the problems of distribution of social and environmental costs between different groups 
based on race, income, location, and gender. Equity of the cost distribution between these 
groups was a key focus in the early discourse, and it has quickly expanded to include a 
range of issues from the unequal nature of environmental protection to the distribution of 
environmental goods (Schlosberg, 2013). Environmental justice scholars and advocates 
identified four distinct aspects of environmental injustice experienced by historically 
marginalized communities (Gonzalez, 2015; Kuehn, 2000). This literature review adopts 
Kuehn (2000)’s framework : first, distributive injustice arising from disproportionate 
exposure to environmental hazards and limited access to environmental amenities 
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(Gonzalez, 2015; Kuehn, 2000); second, procedural unfairness caused by these 
communities’ exclusion from decision-making on issues of environmental issues 
(Gonzalez, 2015; Kuehn, 2000); third, corrective injustice as a result of inadequate 
enforcement of environmental legislation (Gonzalez, 2015; Kuehn, 2000); forth, social 
injustice because environmental degradation is inevitably related to deeper social structural 
ills, such as poverty and racism (Gonzalez, 2015; Kuehn, 2000). Based on these four 
aspects of environmental injustice experienced, there are four different notions of 
environmental justice. The first one is environmental justice as distributive justice. 
Distributive justice means “the right to the same distribution of goods and opportunities as 
anyone else has or is given” (Dworkin, 1977, p273). In this context, environmental justice 
involves the equitable distribution of the burdens or benefits arising from the exploitation 
of natural resources. The second one is environmental justice as procedural justice. 
Procedural justice involves “the right to have equal concern and respect in the political 
decision about how the goods and opportunities are to be distributed” (Dworkin, 1977, 
p.273). In this context, environmental justice means democratic policy decision-making 
processes based on mutual respect and justice that is free from bias or discrimination, with 
the participation of equal partners at every level of decision-making. The third is 
environmental justice as corrective justice. Corrective justice involves the fairness of 
punishments for lawbreaking and damages inflicted on individuals and communities 
(Kuehn, 2000). Environmental justice as corrective justice involves fairness for the 
development and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies including 
attempts to restore the damage from unjust activities. The fourth is environmental justice 
as social justice. Social justice is defined as the fair distribution of important components 
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of living conditions that are needed for individuals, households, and the social stability of 
society (Manderscheid, 2012). In this context, environmental justice is the movement 
intertwined with other forms of social and economic justice-related social problems, such 
as poverty, racism, and political issues (Gonzalez & Atapattu, 2017).  
 
The discourse on environmental justice is further complicated in terms of its geographical 
scope. In the 1980s political scientists started to engage in topics of environmental justice 
in the global south (Temper et al., 2018). Jamieson (1994) points out the juxtaposition of 
the idea of global justice with that of environmental justice, and defines global 
environmental justice as justice between nations and notions of responsibility and moral 
obligations that are mediated by various non-governmental forms of association. Jamieson 
(1994) has mentioned the issues arising from the fact that the poor suffer disproportionately 
from the environmental pollution produced by society; these issues are also raised in the 
international context (Jamieson, 1994). Szasz and Meuser (1997) also pointed out that there 
was a clear overlap between political science and environmental justice since 
environmental injustice is a global phenomenon in terms of distributing the benefits and 
burdens of environmental commodities. From these aspects, the term “global 
environmental justice” refers to the global distribution of environmental burdens and 
benefits (Blake, 2011). In the Blake (2011) study, the author mostly focused on the 




Meanwhile, Roberts (2001) put more focus on the procedural justice side of global 
environmental justice. Roberts (2001) broadly described the inequality between rich and 
poor countries in climate change and described how it has led to the problem of global 
climate change. The author argued that “the only way out of the conundrum of inequity and 
climate change is by both addressing inequality and delinking carbon and 
development”(Roberts, 2001, p. 502). Norgaard (2006) presented the issue of global 
environmental justice in four ways: first, rich countries contribute to climate change highly 
disproportionately compared to the other countries; second, low-lying geography and less 
developed infrastructure in poor countries make the people in these countries vulnerable; 
third, the outcomes and processes of global climate change treaties in general have favored 
the industrialized countries; forth, the current generations are negatively affecting the 
environment and reduce its capacity to sustain life for future generations. These issues 
mostly focused on the problem that less-powerful groups have disproportionate exposure 
to environmental problems which are generated by the more powerful groups (Bullard, 
1990). Accordingly, rich countries, especially for oil exporters, tend to take less 
responsibility than they have contributed to environmental degradations, while poorer 
countries take more damage than they have contributed. To sum up, the issue of 
environmental justice is related to this study in several aspects. The residents of the regions 
where oil and gas exploration takes place are exposed to environmental damages such as 
long-term pollution without proper compensation from the oil and gas companies. Also, 
marine ecosystem changes and climate change caused by the exploitation of oil and gas 




2.4. Sovereign Wealth Funds 
A Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) is defined as a state-owned investment vehicle that is 
created and owned by the government for macroeconomic purposes and employs a set of 
financial investment strategies which include investing in various types of assets, such as 
domestic/foreign equity and real estate, with funding, withdrawal, and spending rules to 
benefit society (Alhashel, 2015; Das & Lu, 2009; Beck & Fidora, 2008). In August 2018, 
total assets managed by SWFs globally were estimated at 8,109.46 billion USD. The 
amount of assets sourced by oil and gas-related revenue was estimated at about 4,410.58 
billion USD of the total and the amount of assets sourced by the other commodities was 
estimated at about 3,698.88 billion USD (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2018). The 
Norwegian petroleum fund is commonly regarded as a successful product of economic 
foresight in a country with strong traditions of long-term planning (Lie, 2018) and is the 
world’s largest SWF. The Alaska Permanent Fund is another good example of a SWF. The 
Alaska Permanent Fund has helped Alaska attain the highest economic equality in the 
United States (Karl Widerquist & Howard, 2012).  
 
The history of SWFs dates back to 1953 when the Kuwait Investment Board was instituted 
for investing surplus oil revenues to reduce the reliance of Kuwait’s economy on oil and 
gas resources (Beck & Fidora, 2008). After that, many resource-rich countries have 
established SWFs to accumulate foreign assets with their natural resources. Although 
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various sources can fund the SWFs, the major countries that have created SWFs are 
resource-rich countries that benefit from high oil and commodity prices (Beck & Fidora, 
2008). There are several reasons why establishing a SWF with revenue from oil and gas is 
beneficial to the states.  
 
Barnett and Ossowski (2002) explain why the oil revenue in an oil-producing country 
should be managed by government policy based on the characteristics of oil revenue. The 
first reason is the exhaustibility of oil revenue, which raises issues of sustainability and 
intergenerational resource allocation of oil revenue. The second reason is the uncertainty 
and volatility of oil revenue. Since policymakers cannot control oil prices, to create and 
implement fiscal policies to mitigate the impact of the oil price volatility on macroeconomy 
is challenging. The third reason is that oil revenue largely depends on foreign demand, 
while the fiscal use of oil revenue has significant consequences for the domestic economy. 
For these reasons, Barnett and Ossowski (2002) recommend that the government should 
accumulate substantial financial assets over the period of oil production. Furthermore, they 
claim that the use of financial assets from oil production should support macroeconomic 
objectives, such as macroeconomic stability, growth, and an efficient allocation of 
resources. Therefore, a proper management of oil revenue is key to ensure a sustainable 
benefits flow derived from oil and gas development. Barkhordar and Saboohi (2013) also 
point out that the mismanagement of oil revenue could lead to a decline in production, 
overvaluation of the foreign exchange rate, and an increase in non-oil imports, and 
ultimately lead to lower economic growth. They analyzed the trade-off between spending 
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and saving for a resource-rich country focused on the medium-term effects of windfall 
management strategies of resource revenue. The results revealed that investment in 
physical assets of oil windfalls leads to higher economic growth in the medium run and 
investment in financial assets of oil revenues leads to higher economic growth in the long 
run. Nguyen et al. (2013), however, show that resource-rich countries tend to underinvest 
in their public capital stock while their resource revenues should be used primarily to 
finance domestic investment in order to expand the capital stock and promote growth. 
These studies show that the revenue from resource extraction should be controlled by the 
government, and the government should invest the revenue leading to higher economic 
growth in the long run and promoting the sustainable use of natural resources.  
 
The main purposes of SWFs are stabilizing government revenues and the accumulation of 
savings in resource-rich countries for future generations to offset the future lack of 
resources for growth (Das & Lu, 2009). The investment portfolio of a SWF helps maintain 
the stability of the domestic economy as well as guarantees a stable and sustainable source 
of future income (Reiche, 2010; Sun et al., 2014). Al-sasi et al. (2017) and Tehranchian 
and Seyyedkolaee (2017) also assert that establishing SWFs protects the economy from the 
risk of oil price/market volatility and thereby positively affects economic growth.  
 
However, some scholars do not agree with the practicality of establishing a SWF. Truman 
(2007) asserts that a SWF generally has a lack of transparency, potential to disrupt financial 
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markets, and the risk that political intentions might influence the management of a SWF. 
Drezner (2008) also insists that establishing a SWF will increase market volatility when 
the size is too large and investment policies are not transparent. The author has mentioned 
that “sovereign wealth funds are simply the latest manifestation of explosive asset growth” 
(Drezner, 2008). Enderwick (2017) also asserted that a SWF is seen as potentially unstable, 
as it is sensitive to changing economic conditions, which can impact on both its source as 
well as its returns. Therefore, the proper operation of the SWF after establishment is also 
important to avoid potential shortcomings. 
 
The following studies state that several conditions are required for a successful SWF. 
Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) mention that withdrawal decisions should be regulated in 
part by clear rules rather than general guidelines, key decisions should be made by bodies 
representing the interests of diverse political constituencies, and there should be high levels 
of transparency regarding their status and operation, and in particular, there should be a 
unified budgetary process and public reporting of payments, holdings, and investments 
(Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007). Balding (2012) presents three primary factors that make 
a SWF successful. First, a successful SWF needs a predictable and dedicated capital source. 
Second, without clear and defined rules for withdrawal of fund capital, a SWF is little more 
than political slush funds. Third, a SWF should be free from political winds and 
capriciousness to ensure the highest degree of independence possible. Le and Munthe-Dahl 
(2014) assert that the funds from resource revenue should be used based on strict rules for 
increasing transparency and for reducing expenditure volatility. Expenditure volatility and 
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sustainability can be addressed by setting restrictions on fund spending, including both 
budgetary and extrabudgetary spending (Le & Munthe-Dahl, 2014). They also said that 
transparency is an important prerequisite for a natural resource fund to avoid the resource 
curse in the long run. Therefore, SWFs need to have clear rules and policies regarding their 
source and expenditures and especially establish a clear relationship between the fund and 
the government budget. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the concepts and definitions which are key elements to establish 
the research framework of this study. The goal of this study is to suggest a way forward for 
the sustainable development of the Newfoundland and Labrador province by using its oil 
and gas revenue. In line with the capital approach to sustainability, the sustainability of 
Newfoundland and Labrador can be achieved when four capitals (produced capital, natural 
capital, human capital, and social capital), which contribute to the formation of wealth, are 
maintained at the sustainable level. On the other hand, development based on the oil and 
gas industry is recognized as not being sustainable in the long run, especially for the reasons 
of the “resource curse” and “environmental injustice”. One way to sustain the development 
based on the oil and gas industry is to accumulate financial capital using oil and gas revenue 
that can be invested to build other capitals and minimize the negative impact of the 
development. A SWF has been defined as a state-owned investment vehicle that can 
increase the benefits to society from oil and gas revenue and helps achieve sustainable 
development when it is properly managed and invested to protect or grow the four capitals. 
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Therefore, a SWF has the potential to bring the long-term benefits arising from the 





3. Research Methods  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The goal of this feasibility study is to explore the validity of introducing an oil revenue-
sharing instrument for the province of NL, aiming to secure a fair distribution of revenues 
from the oil and gas development and maintain the sustainability of the province of NL. 
The analysis is especially focused on the conditions for establishing a SWF funded by 
revenues from oil and gas extraction. There are two alternatives for the government to 
collect and redistribute resource revenue, which are direct use and indirect use. Direct use 
of resource revenue means a direct deposit of resource revenue into government revenues 
to reduce taxation and increase spending (Erwin, 2020; Pretes, 2005). This can boost short-
term economic growth, however, it is often problematic as it can lead to inflation and even 
the collapse of the economy, if the capacity for growth is exhausted (Pretes, 2005). The 
other alternative, indirect use of resource revenue, is to establish funds by which resource 
revenue is isolated and stabilizes its entry to the economy (Pretes, 2005). The investment 
vehicles that are created and owned by the government for specific policy purposes are 
called  Sovereign Wealth Funds (Alhashel, 2015; Das & Lu, 2009; Beck & Fidora, 2008). 
SWFs help to secure government revenue and spending, stabilize the domestic economy, 
and accumulate sustainable sources of future income (Das & Lu, 2009; Reiche, 2010; Sun 





Since there is no such fund in the province of NL yet, the analysis has started with a 
thorough literature review, and will be followed by case studies of two regions that already 
have a SWF mechanism funded by oil and gas revenue. These are Norway and the Alaska.  
 
 
3.2 Research Design 
Case studies will be conducted to provide implications about how to boost the sustainability 
of a jurisdiction using SWFs funded by resource revenues. From the literature review of 
chapter 2, sustainability can be determined by analyzing how to manage the four capitals 
(produced capital, natural capital, human capital, social capital) to keep them undiminished. 
The amount of these capitals cannot be solely captured by market value or quantitative data 
(Ekins et al., 2008; Maack & Davidsdottir, 2015). Therefore, this study adopts a Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis for the comparative case studies 
to explore the feasibility of a SWF for NL. SWOT analysis is defined as a tool for analyzing 
internal and external environments by focusing on the strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, 
and threats to support the decision-making process (Ghazinoory et al., 2011). The result of 
the SWOT analysis presents internal and external factors that help to understand the current 
status and provide a basis for successful future strategies (H. H. Chang & Huang, 2006; 




The case studies consist of three parts. The first part looks at the sustainability issues of the 
regions, related to the oil and gas industry. In the second part, a SWOT analysis of the SWF 
in the region is carried out based on the outcomes of the first part. Based on these results, 
the implications of how to promote the NL's sustainability using its oil and gas revenues 
are identified in the last part of this study.  
 
1) Case Study 
The main objective of this study is to find out if it is possible to save and use a part of the 
oil revenue from the off-shore oil extraction in NL to contribute to the sustainability of NL, 
under the hypothetical scenario that the province creates a SWF using its oil and gas 
revenues. This study will employ a comparative case study approach using qualitative 
methods to investigate the feasibility of creating a SWF for NL by investigating cases of 
two jurisdictions that are already managing SWFs funded by oil and gas revenue.  
 
A comparative case study approach is “an in-depth investigation of the similarities and 
differences across cases to verify a proposition about whether an intervention should be 
made or not and how to tailor the intervention to accomplish intended outcomes” (Goodrick, 
2014, p.1). Qualitative research using a comparative case study has the strength of using 
multiple sources of data that help to construct the validity of the research (Nyambi, 2012; 
Yin, 2009). The comparison can bring a deeper understanding of knowledge that the 
researcher may not have been when cases are compared in relation to the same concepts 
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(Gharawi et al., 2009). In this study, the target issue that needs to be addressed is “how 
could the SWFs funded by resource revenue contribute to the sustainability and 
development of the society?” The comparative analysis is built on similarities and 
differences of the cases and it is pivotal to investigate the connections and causalities 
brought by the differences between cases (McFarlane & Robinson, 2012). Norway and the 
US state of Alaska have similarities by being resource-rich countries, but they have a 
different framework for how to collect and spend the fund along with the different historical 
backgrounds, which will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
On the other hand, there are inherent challenges of a comparative approach, especially 
when a qualitative cross-national research is carried out. The information needs to be 
interpreted across historical, cultural, institutional, and socio-political contexts, which 
provides significant difficulties (Quilgars et al., 2009). Also, even statistical data often have 
a lack of standardization as a result of institutional differences between countries, and the 
researcher can confront un-interpretable material due to language barriers (Jørgensen, 2015; 
Quilgars et al., 2009). Therefore, it should be recognized that all findings from the case 
studies are conditional based on spatial and temporal factors (Hantrais, 2000). This is 
substantially challenging as this study investigates three different cases and there were a 
few instances where literature about Norway had to be excluded as it is written in 




The data for the case studies include primarily a literature review of published reports, 
government papers, books, periodicals, newspapers, and peer-reviewed papers published 
by November 2019. The keywords for searching the literature initially were selected among 
a set of sustainability issues regarding the oil and gas industry identified in the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (2018). 
 
2) SWOT Analysis 
The SWOT analysis has been proposed by Ken Andrews in 1971 as a strategic analysis tool 
for management (Mobaraki, 2014). SWOT analysis is defined as a tool for analyzing 
internal and external environments by focusing on the strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, 
and threats in order to promote a systematic approach and support for decision-making 
(Ghazinoory et al., 2011). The process of the SWOT analysis includes exploring the 
internal and external environments of a proposed project and extracting implementation 
strategies based on its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (Ghazinoory et al., 
2011). Strengths represent available resources that help to improve its performance and 
make it effective; weaknesses are weak spots that can cause decreased competitiveness, 
efficiency, or financial resources; opportunities are exogenous changes that can cause 
additional development or future improvement; and threats are external factors that may 
induce problems (Chen et al., 2014; Paliwal, 2006). After examining the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the issues, the future strategy can be developed 
based on the results, and the one advantage of the strategies derived from the SWOT 
analysis is that they provide historic insights from the previous strategies implemented 
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successfully (Houben et al., 1999). The result of a SWOT analysis provides a rich array of 
factors for future strategic initiatives (Dyson, 2004). The results of the SWOT analysis 
carried out in this study provide insights to explore the validity of introducing an oil fund 
system for sustainability in NL.  
 
3) Selection of Cases 
The first step of a case study is to decide how many cases will be included (Meyer, 2001). 
Case studies can include single or multiple cases, and there are no simple rules to decide 
the number of cases (Jennifer, 2000). Generally, single case studies are preferred when the 
case is unique for some reason and multiple case studies are preferred when there are 
theories to be substantiated through the case studies (Jennifer, 2000; Meyer, 2001). 
According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2020), there are 122 SWFs in the world 
as of 2020. These include 42 SWFs funded by oil and gas and others funded by non-oil and 
gas commodities and some instances with countries having multiple SWFs.  
This study is not intended to prove that the introduction of a SWF generally achieves the 
sustainability of a society using non-renewable resources, but seeks to find implications for 
successful designs of SWFs. While 122 SWFs cases all have their characteristics and 
implications, it is technically impossible to analyze or elaborate the characteristics of all 
122 cases to select the best cases for this study. Therefore, this study chooses two cases of 
SWFs that are commonly considered as good benchmarks of SWFs funded by non-
renewable resources in existing literature (Alhashel, 2015; Ang, 2010a, 2010b; Das & Lu, 
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2009; Fiedorczuk, 2015; Halvorssen, 2009; Hartzok, 2012; Murphy & Clemens, 2013; 
Reiche, 2010; Widerquist & Howard, 2012a), which are the Norwegian SWF and the 
Alaskan SWF. Two case study designs allow for comparison between the two cases as well 
as a deeper look at each case (Meyer, 2001). As mentioned in Chapter 1.2, Norway has the 
world’s largest SWF and Alaska has the largest SWF amongst any territorial entity within 
a country as of 2019. A few Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
member countries have substantially-sized SWFs too, but they are not considered as good 
benchmarks for analysis due to lack of transparency of their management (Bazoobandi, 
2011). The two-case studies chosen show different practices of SWFs, as Norway’s SWF’s 
focus is to finance future liabilities while Alaska’s SWF provides a basic income for 
Alaskans. Therefore, the analysis of the two cases could deliver significant implications to 




4. Case Study 1: Norway 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the case study of Norway. The Norwegian experience of SWFs has 
been considered as a successful case of the management of oil and gas resources (Ang, 
2010a; Bagattini, 2011; Onditi, 2019; Polus & Tycholiz, 2017). Oil booms can bring 
incredible wealth to some countries, while it is not the case for other countries which may 
experience the “resource curse” phenomenon. Norway is often seen as a country that 
avoided the “resource curse” owing to its successful management of the revenue from oil 
and gas resources by using a SWF (Elwerfelli & Benhin, 2018). The social-democratic 
ideas dominating in Norway’s society were the background conditions that had led Norway 
to manage its oil wealth successfully. The Norwegian people have valued highly the 
equality and integrity of the individual, and the ideas of Norwegian egalitarianism have 
inspired a range of legal provisions for equality between the genders, and a progressive 
system of taxation and subsidies (Didier, 2011; Friedson et al., 2013; Ø terud, 2005; Truman 
Phillips, 2008). Accordingly, Norway has adopted a solid social democratic rule with the 
legitimacy of a strong state (Olsen, 2002; Visher & Remoe., 1984). The role of the state 
generally encompasses regulating the market, the development of social trust, and 
redistributing wealth, as well as promoting economic development (Herreros & Criado, 
2008; Visher & Remoe., 1984). The social value of the equality and integrity and the 
legitimacy of a strong state has allowed the Norwegian government to establish a state-
controlled joint-stock company “Statoil” for the oil and gas development and to create the 
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Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) (Edwards, 1987; Onifade, 2015). With the 
Statoil company, Norway has control over their oil and gas revenue and can turn it into 
long-term wealth to sustain the benefits for the Norwegian people (Onifade, 2015).  
 
 
4.2 Norway’s SWF: The Government Pension Fund 
Norway’s exploration of oil and gas resources started in 1962 when the country started to 
collect seismic data of the Norwegian continental shelf. The first exploration well was 
drilled in 1966 and the first oil well on the Norwegian shelf was discovered in 1967, 
however, it was not considered economically feasible at that time (the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2014). The first successful oil field on the Norwegian continental 
shelf, Ekofisk, was discovered in 1969. Ekofisk was the largest offshore oil field ever 
discovered in Norway, and its commercial production started in 1971. After the discovery 
of Ekofisk, there were a series of discoveries of large oil fields, such as Statfjord, discovered 
in 1974, Gullfaks, discovered in 1978, Oseberg, discovered in 1979 and Troll, discovered 
in 1983. The Norwegian oil era set off with these developments.  
 
By the time those oil fields were discovered, state-led development was common in many 
industries because of the common belief about the state-capital relationship and the role of 
the state in providing for the community (Truman Phillips, 2008). In a social-democratic 
welfare society, the state can to exert control over industry (Visher & Remoe., 1984). 
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Moreover, Norwegian society also has skepticism toward foreign capital from a wide range 
of actors, including business and economic sectors (Ryggvik, 2015; Truman Phillips, 2008). 
Rather, they have valued highly the equality and integrity of the Norwegian people (Eriksen, 
1993) and believed that the resources in  Norway belonged to the nation (Olsen, 2002). 
Therefore, Norway has set solid social democratic rules with the legitimacy of a strong 
state to benefit the society as a whole from oil and gas development (Visher & Remoe, 
1984; Olsen, 2002). Norway acknowledges that future generations should also be eligible 
for the oil and gas benefits (Onifade, 2015). Additionally, at the time, there was a need for 
a new industry to drive the growth of existing industries and the formation of capitals in 
Norway (Ryggvik, 2015). The development of the series of oil fields required 
unprecedented investment, and the off-shore related industries that already existed in 
Norway, such as the shipbuilding industry, the power plant construction industry, and the 
other offshore-related service industries, were potential beneficiaries (Ryggvik, 2015). 
These views on the state-capital relationship and the industrial needs have led the Norway 
government to make important policy decisions to avoid the “resource curse” at the early 
stage of oil and gas development.  
 
In 1972, the Norwegian parliament (Storting) founded the Norwegian state-owned oil and 
gas company Statoil (the name has changed to Equinor in 2018), and the Parliament enacted 
the 50% ownership of the government in each oil and gas production license (the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy, 2014). Thus, Statoil paid a 50% share of costs of oil and gas 
production activities and received a 50% share of returns (Poelzer, 2015). As of 2018, the 
51 
 
Norwegian government has a 67% ownership share in Statoil. As the cash flow from the 
oil and gas production to the government revenue increased, the Norwegian government 
has been able to use fiscal policy to respond to external economic shocks, such as the oil 
shock in 1973 (Halonen, 2014).  
 
As cash flow into Statoil increased, in 1985, the Norwegian government created the State’s 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) to reorganize the management of assets (Poelzer, 2015) 
The SDFI is a system establishing that the Norwegian government owns a share in oil and 
gas fields, pipelines and onshore facilities. The ownership interest is set in connection with 
the award of production licenses, and the size of the interest varies from field to field (the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014).  
 
In 1990, The Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) was established to ensure the oil 
and gas wealth can benefit both current and future generations when using the Norwegian 
government’s oil and gas revenues. The transfers to the GPFG started in 1996 (the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy, 2014). The GPFG is a type of a SWF as it draws its funding from 
oil revenues and has a mandate beyond financing pension expenditures (Blundell-wignall 
et al., 2008). An important reason for the success of the GPFG has been the strong 
democratic tradition of Norway. A SWF allows the state itself to build up a source of 
revenue distinct from its traditional fiscal base and the future growth of capital returns to 
be leveraged for public purposes, rather than driving inequality (Neill, 2016). The fact that 
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Norway facilitates saving to finance pensions based on the principle of intergenerational 
equity, makes the Norwegian SWF different from the SWFs in other countries.  
 
The fund was accumulated from the revenue from the oil and gas activities, and grows its 
income through returns, including interest and yield on the fund’s investments. The oil and 
gas companies are charged a 27% corporation income tax and a 51% special tax rate for 
the extraordinary profit associated with recovering the oil and gas resources, a total of 78% 
tax rate as of 2018 (the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014). Norway’s oil and gas tax 
revenues are estimated to around 119 billion Norwegian Krone (NOK) (about 14 billion 
USD) in 2018 (Norwegian Petroleum, 2019c). The Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
this oil and gas industry taxation. The revenue from oil and gas development was gradually 
phased into the economy by covering the structural non-oil and gas deficit (the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2014).  
 
There are distinguishing features of the GPFG that have helped to avoid the “resource curse” 
in Norway by utilizing the fund. First, the GPFG does not invest in the domestic sector to 
protect the non-oil sectors in Norway from the volatility of oil and gas revenue by reducing 
the impact of oil price changes on the fund value (Roach et al., 2015). At the end of 2018, 
the fund was invested in a total of 9,158 companies, 4,811 bonds, and real estate in 73 
countries (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2018). Second, short-term spending can 
be either higher or lower than the expected real returns of the fund investment; however, 
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its long-term spending has to be below the fund’s expected real returns. On average, the 
Norwegian government has spent only under the expected real investment return which is 
generally 3% to 4% (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2019a; Poelzer, 2015). The 
fund, however, is so large that the 4% of GPFG is more than the Norwegian government’s 
needs (Poelzer, 2015).  10,088 billion NOK (1,148 billion USD) in 2019, which makes it 
the world's largest sovereign wealth fund (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2019a). 
 
 
4.3 The Sustainability of Norway and the Oil and Gas Industry 
 
4.3.1 The Oil and Gas Industry and Financial Capital 
The oil and gas industry has a crucial influence on the Norwegian economy. The oil and 
gas industry in Norway accounted for a 17% share of GDP in 2018 and made the largest 
contribution in added value to government revenues, investments and export value 
(Norwegian Petroleum, 2019c). Since oil and gas production started in the early 1970s, the 
oil and gas industry has contributed more than NOK 14,000 billion (about USD 1,630 
billion) to Norway’s GDP (Norwegian Petroleum, 2019c). The total export value of oil and 
gas in Norway in 2017 was about NOK 442 billion (about USD 51 billion) and it is about 
50% of the total value of Norway’s exports of goods (see Figure 2) (Norwegian Petroleum, 
2019b). About 79.2% of crude oil produced and 76.3% of natural gas produced in 2017 
was delivered to other countries, such as countries in Europe, Canada, and China 
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(Norwegian Petroleum, 2019b). Norway is the 3rd largest exporter of natural gas in the 
global market and supplies about 25% of the EU gas demand. Norway also covers about 
2 % of the global crude oil demand (Norwegian Petroleum, 2019b).  
 
 
Figure 2. Export Value of Norwegian Petroleum, 1971-2017 
Source. Reprinted from the Export value of Norwegian petroleum, 1971-2017, by 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, retrieved from: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/ 
production-and-exports/oil-and-gas-production/# 
 
The Norwegian SWF (GPFG) aims to make the oil and gas wealth benefit both current and 
future generations (the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014).  The current and future 




















































of the fund, the relatively low tax rate for residents and low unemployment (the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy, 2014; Fischer, 2007). The total value of the GPFG has steadily 
increased, and the expected total value was 10,088 billion NOK (1,148 billion USD) in 
2019 which is the largest SWF in the world (see Figure 3). Owing to the high tax rate (78% 
in 2018) on the oil and gas production and the robust spending limits, which is under the 
expected real investment return (usually 3% to 4%), GPFG has established a solid 
foundation. 
  
Figure 3. Total Market Value of the Government Pension Fund Global 
Source. Data from Norges Bank Investment Management (2019) 
 
 



















Norway has been the world’s 13th largest oil producer and 7th largest gas producer as of 
2017 (BP, 2018). All of the Norwegian oil reserves are located offshore on the Norwegian 
continental shelf, which is divided into the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents 
Sea (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016). The total Norwegian proven oil 
reserves have been estimated at 7.9 billion barrels at the end of 2017, which accounts for 
0.5% of the world’s proven oil reserves (BP, 2018). The total Norwegian proven natural 
gas reserves have been estimated at 1.7 trillion cubic metres at the end of 2017, which 
accounts for 0.9% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves (BP, 2018). Norway’s daily 
oil production is around 2 million barrels, and its natural gas production is around 120 
billion cubic metres per year (International Energy Agency, 2017) (see Figure 4). The daily 
production of oil now is about 40% below the peak in 2001 and 6% lower in 2018 than in 
the previous year; however, the oil and gas companies in Norway are planning to increase 
their production of oil and gas from 2020 to 2023 due to the high demand for gas from 





Figure 4. Historical and Expected Oil and Gas Production in Norway, 1970-2023 
Source. Reprinted from Historical and expected production in Norway, 1970-2023, by 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, retrieved from: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/ 
production-and-exports/oil-and-gas-production/# 
 
4.3.3 The Oil and Gas Industry and Natural Capital 
The oil and gas exploitation can deteriorate the ecosystem through every stage of the 
activities from exploration to transportation and the process by which its products are 
consumed. According to Stiansen and Filin (2008) which reviewed the environmental risk 
of oil and gas exploitation on the Barents sea adjacent to the northern part of Norway, the 
key risk related to oil and gas exploitation is an oil spill accident during exploration or 
production. Norway already has experienced several oil spill accidents. The first and 




































field on the Norwegian continental shelf. Oil spilled from the Bravo production platform 
on the Ekofisk oil field on April 22 in 1977, and the total amount of spilled oil was 
estimated to be up to approximately 202,380 barrels at the rate of 1,170 barrels per hour 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016). The oil slick from the accident 
covered about 1500 km2 of the Norwegian sea, and threatened herring, haddock, sprats, and 
mackerel, especially since it was shortly before the spawning season (Hudson, 1977). The 
second accident was at the Statfjord oilfield, which is the largest oil field in Norway, on 
December 12, 2007. About 21,750 barrels of oil spilled, and this is the second-largest oil 
spill accident in Norwegian history (BBC, 2007). The accident occurred while the tanker 
was loading oil from storage. The oil spill made an oil slick 10 km long and 5 km wide 
(Kelly, 2007).  
 
In Norway, an environmental impact assessment must be conducted prior to drilling, when 
opening a new oil and gas field. In terms of the ecosystem, the environmental impact 
assessment  aims to protect valuable and vulnerable areas, fisheries, and sensitive species 
(Cordes et al., 2016). The environmental impact assessment includes an assessment of the 
possible impact of an oil spill accident. The process of the environmental impact 
assessment  for the possible impact of an oil spill accident focuses on the impact on eggs 
or larvae without considering the dynamic movement of the ecosystem (Hjermann et al., 
2007). However, the actual long-term impact of oil spill accidents on the ecosystems is 
difficult to estimate, as they are affected by numerous parameters, such as weather 
conditions, location and depth of the oil spill, spawning time and site of fishes, density of 
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the eggs, length of the spawning season, the amount of persistent oil residues, and other 
factors which are unknown  (Cordes et al., 2016; Hjermann et al., 2007; Wake, 2005).  
 
The fishing industry had played central roles until the oil and gas industry has started 
dominating the Norwegian economy, and still is one of the dominant industries in Norway 
(Ramsey, 2014). In 2018, fish and other fishing products were the fourth largest export 
product with 6.1% of the total export value after crude petroleum and natural gas (52.8%), 
coke and refined petroleum products (8.7%), and basic metals (6.9%) (Statistics Norway, 
2019b). Since the offshore oil and gas development started in Norway, the fishing industry 
and oil and gas industry have coexisted for nearly 50 years.  
 
However, Arne (2012) points out that the Norwegian fishers feel that the oil industry 
threatens the ecosystem in the ocean as the fish stocks and catches have declined compared 
to the stocks before the era of oil and gas. However,  they admit that part of the reason was 
overfishing by international fleet and the consequent changes in spawning areas (Arne, 
2012). Therefore, there has been a conflict between fishers and the oil and gas industry 
since the beginning of the oil and gas production on the Norwegian shelf in the 1970s (Arbo 
& Thuy, 2016; Arne, 2012). The Norwegian government has tried to improve the 
relationship between the fishing industry and the oil and gas industry. As stated by the 
Research Council of Norway (2012), the Norwegian government adopts many instruments 
to contribute to good coexistence between the fishing industry and oil and gas industry, 
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including the impact assessment on industries, society, and the environment by the ministry 
of energy and petroleum and oil and gas companies. Also they prohibit oil and gas activities 
on important fishing grounds, spawning areas, and nursery areas, provide the compensation 
program for fishers when the oil and gas industry causes economic loss, restrict discharges 
of effluent, and fishery liaisons participate in seismic surveys of oil and gas industry 
(Research Council of Norway, 2012, as cited in Arbo & Thuy, 2016).  
 
Another big concern related to oil and gas exploitation and the natural capital is CO2 
emissions from the oil and gas extraction and burning processes (Sollund, 2012). Although 
Norway has succeeded in reducing carbon dioxide emissions slightly over the last decade, 
oil and gas extraction accounted for about 31.2% of the total CO2 emissions amount in 
Norway in 2018 (see Table 1). The share of CO2 from oil and gas development in Norway's 
total domestic CO2 emissions in the 2000s has increased significantly at relatively steady 
rates in the 2010s, considering that the share of CO2 from oil and gas development in 1990 
was 22.2% (Table 1). Besides, the Norwegian oil and gas industry is a big contributor to 
global CO2 emissions as they export a large amount of oil to other countries. Many global 
energy experts have pointed out the high total carbon footprint of Norway’s fossil fuels 
generated outside of Norway’s borders, although Norway has progressive policies on 
climate change (Kaye, 2017). According to McKinnon at al.  (2017), the CO2 emissions 
amount  due to using the Norwegian oil and gas industry products outside of Norway is 
about 10 times more than the domestic CO2 emissions in Norway, which makes Norway 
the seventh-largest CO2 emissions exporter. Peters and Hertwich (2006) also showed that 
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Norway’s global CO2 emissions are 67% greater than its domestic emissions (Peters & 
Hertwich, 2006). Kartha et al.(2018) also asserted that Norway should make 50 percent 
more mitigation efforts than the average OECD countries in tonnes of CO2 per capita 
considering that their prosperity has been based on fossil fuels.  
 
Table 1. CO2 emissions to air in Norway 1990 - 2018 (unit: 1000 tonnes) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total 35,323 33,818 34,737 36,224 38,087 38,704 41,824 41,920 42,211 42,962 
O&G industry 7,850 7,681 8,149 8,572 9,318 9,481 10,333 10,738 10,437 10,965 
O&G/Total 22.2% 22.7% 23.5% 23.7% 24.5% 24.5% 24.7% 25.6% 24.7% 25.5% 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 42,515 43,867 42,984 44,323 44,646 43,951 44,496 46,239 45,382 43,891 
O&G industry 12,242 13,140 12,911 13,161 13,365 13,414 13,114 14,489 14,240 13,171 
O&G/Total 28.8% 30.0% 30.0% 29.7% 29.9% 30.5% 29.5% 31.3% 31.4% 30.0% 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
Total 46,229 45,512 45,022 44,947 44,890 45,304 44,462 43,760 43,933 
O&G industry 13,341 13,091 13,203 13,181 13,901 14,404 14,083 13,909 13,701 
O&G/Total 28.9% 28.8% 29.3% 29.3% 31.0% 31.8% 31.7% 31.8% 31.2% 
Source. Data from Statistics Norway (2019a) 
 
 




There is no significant investment or contribution of the SWF to the human capital in 
Norway. There are expected indirect contributions from oil and gas industry and the GPFG 
to the human capital in Norway, however. According to the World Economic Forum (2017), 
the level of human capital of a country is affected by several factors that are related to 
industrial activities, such as employment rate, knowhow, and staff training. Considering 
the amount of jobs provided by the oil and gas industry (see Table 2), maintaining the oil 
and gas industry will also be important for maintaining human capital. The oil and gas 
industry is an important source of job creation in Norway. In the 1990s, the number of 
people employed in the oil and gas industry accounted for about 1% of the total labor force 
of Norway, and the number increased up to 2.5% in 2013 (see Table 2). However, the share 
has decreased to below 2% in recent years as there were industrial efforts to comply with 
future de-petrolization trends (Table 2) (Norwegian Petroleum, 2019a). In 2018, the 
number of employees in the oil and gas industry was about 51,600 persons (Table 3). If we 
include all the employees in industries that are directly or indirectly related to the oil 
industry, however, the number goes up much higher. Brasch, Hungnes, and Strøm (2018) 
claim that about 17,200 persons, which accounts for 6.1% of Norway’s labor force, were 
employed in the industries directly or indirectly related to the oil and gas industry.  
 
Table 2. Number of Employees in Oil and Gas Industry in Norway 1990 - 2018 (unit: 
1000 persons) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 




extraction 21.3 21.8 23.1 24.7 24.9 24.0 24.5 26.7 27.5 27.3 
O&G/Total 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 2319.7 2334.5 2323.2 2287.6 2293.7 2318.5 2392.5 2484.6 2564.2 2554.6 
O&G 
extraction 25.7 29.4 32.4 32.3 32.8 35.0 37.3 45.4 48.7 51.7 
O&G/Total 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
Total 2547.4 2584.2 2637.1 2666.4 2694.0 2706.8 2714.8 2747.4 2792.5 
O&G 
extraction 53.9 56.8 61.8 65.8 66.8 61.4 54.0 51.4 51.6 
O&G/Total 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.8% 




4.3.5 The Oil and Gas Industry and Social Capital  
 
Social capital is rather confusing to define and hard to measure (Maack & Davidsdottir, 
2015; Zhao, 2002). In general, social capital is defined as “the social norms, shared values 
and institutional arrangements that foster co-operation among population groups” (OECD, 
2020, p. 234). Based on the report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Norway is the top performing country among the OECD countries 
in terms of managing social capitals, and one of the factors that build social capitals in 




While there are no studies on the direct relationship between the social capital in Norway 
and GPFG, the Listhaug (2005) study seems to be the only study so far investigating the 
relationship between oil wealth and public trust in the government in Norway. The findings 
from the study provide interesting points about the management of oil wealth. First of all, 
it is true that Norwegian people have high trust in their government compared to the other 
countries in the world (Listhaug, 2005). Second, however, they also showed  mild 
dissatisfaction about the fact that the growing oil wealth cannot be utilized to meet the 
public demands, such as more public services and lower taxes, and they want more 
spending of oil wealth immediately as the oil wealth becomes more visible (Listhaug, 2005). 
The author pointed out that this dissatisfaction can lead to less political trust. It is hard to 
generalize the result of this analysis as there were no following or related studies after this, 
however, the study shows the potential effect of oil wealth spending and saving on the 
dynamics of trust in government. 
 
Meanwhile, the Norwegian government has set up regulations and frameworks to ensure 
that oil and gas development has a positive impact on society. The Norwegian economy 
and the standard of living intimately depend on oil and gas production. Expansion of oil 
and gas production in Norway in the 1990s, after its beginning in the 1970s, contributed 
significantly to the Norwegian economy and the high standard of living, allegedly placing 
Norway among the few countries in the world that have highly benefited from fossil fuels 
(Norgaard, 2006). Various institutions, including the Storting (Parliament), government, 
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and ministries, are in charge of managing the oil and gas industry based on a hierarchical 
structure (Hansen & Midtgard, 2008). The Storting is in charge of passing legislation, 
adopting propositions, responding to white papers, and supervising the government and the 
public administration, and the government has the executive power over oil and gas policy 
(Hansen & Midtgard, 2008). The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is responsible for the 
management of oil and gas resources based on the guidelines drawn up by the Storting and 
the government with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate which is an important advisory 
body for the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Hansen & Midtgard, 2008). On June 14, 
1971, the Storting (Norwegian Parliament) submitted a white paper aiming to ensure that 
the entire society enjoys the benefits of oil and gas resources (Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2011). The paper includes 10 principles that should be reflected in 
the oil and gas policies. These principles refer to the fact that Norwegian resources should 
be managed by the Norwegian governmental authority in a way that ensures the benefits 
for the entire society. The principles are:  
1. That national supervision and control of all activity on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf must be ensured. 
2. That the petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a manner designed to ensure 
maximum independence for Norway in terms of reliance on others for supply of 
crude oil. 
3. That new business activity must be developed, based on petroleum. 
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4. That the development of an oil industry must take place with necessary 
consideration for existing commercial activity, as well as protection of nature and 
the environment. 
5. That flaring of exploitable gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf must only be 
allowed in limited test periods. 
6. That petroleum from the Norwegian Continental Shelf must, as a main rule, be 
landed in Norway, with the exception of special cases in which socio-political 
considerations warrant a different solution. 
7. That the State involves itself at all reasonable levels, contributes to coordinating 
Norwegian interests within the Norwegian petroleum industry, and to developing 
an integrated Norwegian oil community with both national and international 
objectives. 
8. That a state-owned oil company be established to safeguard the State’s 
commercial interests, and to pursue expedient cooperation with domestic and 
foreign oil stakeholders. 
9. That an activity plan must be adopted for the area north of the 62nd parallel which 
satisfies the unique socio-political factors associated with that part of the country. 
10. That Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks to Norway’s 
foreign policy. 
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p. 8) 
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The Norwegian government takes a share of the revenue from the oil and gas industry 
through taxes, charges, direct ownership, and dividends from ownership (Hansen & 
Midtgard, 2008). In the late 1990s, the inflow of money to the fund increased significantly, 
and there was a need for guidelines on how much of the fund should be spent (Holden, 
2013). In 2001, the Norwegian government set the first fiscal rule for the GPFG. The new 
fiscal rule incorporates the following features: “the fund should be invested in a diversified 
portfolio”… “Each year, the expected real return from the fund should be transferred back 
to cover the non-oil structural budget deficit on the government budget” (Holden, 2013, p. 
874).  
 
The GPFG also has an ethical mandate to offset the harm from environmental degradation 
from the production and use of oil and gas and ensure the long-term growth of the society. 
The Ministry of Finance is in charge of the management of the GPFG, and the Ministry of 
Finance views the management of GPFG as reflecting “a fundamental social perspective” 
(Ministry of Finance, 2008). The Fund’s mission has evolved to include ethics as a core 
component of the investment policy, projecting Norwegian beliefs around the world (Clark 
et al., 2010). In Section 5.1 of the Guidelines for the Management of the Fund, the Ministry 
sets out two statements of principle: first, ‘‘the Fund is an instrument for ensuring that a 
reasonable portion of the country’s petroleum wealth benefits future generations’’ and 
‘‘financial wealth must be managed with a view to generating a sound return in the long 
term, which is contingent on sustainable development in the economic, environmental and 
social sense’’; Second, ‘‘the Fund shall not make investments that entail an unacceptable 
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risk that the Fund is contributing to unethical acts or omissions’’, including violations of 
humanitarian principles, human rights, gross corruption, and severe environmental damage.  
 
The current legal framework of the GPFG is set by the Government Pension Fund Act No. 
123 of 21 December 2005, which clearly states the purpose of the Fund, the management 
of the fund, specification of the income to the fund, and the use of the capital of the fund, 
and it is easily accessible for the public (Halonen, 2014). This information can be easily 
accessed and is easy to understand, and it helps the fund appear credible and stable for the 
public (Halonen, 2014).  
 
4.4 SWOT Analysis 
 
1) Strengths 
The first strength of the Norwegian SWF is its strong accumulation system. The fund was 
accumulated from the revenue from the oil and gas activities, and income through returns, 
including interest and yield on the fund’s investments, and it is the largest SWF in the world 
with the size of  10,088 billion NOK (1,148 billion USD) in 2019 (Norges Bank Investment 
Management, 2019a). Its long-term spending has to be below the fund’s expected real 
returns as well, which is about 4% (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2019a). The 4% 
of the GPFG is larger than the Norwegian government’s need for a year. In terms of weak 




Its capacity to deal with external economic shocks, such as oil price fluctuations, is another 
strength of the GPFG. This strength is coming from the strong accumulation and its 
responsible and diversified investment portfolio. For example, Norway was one of the oil 
producing countries that minimized the impact from the global economic shock arising 
from a 40% drop in crude oil price in 2015 (Giles, 2014; Waldholz, 2016). Thanks to their 
world’s largest SWF that has twice the size of its economy, the Government of Norway 
could balance its budget (Giles, 2014; Waldholz, 2016). Also, the GPFG has helped 
Norway to get through the COVID-19 pandemic. Norway plans to draw 382 billion NOK 
(US$37 billion) from the fund to minimize damages from the pandemic (Bloomberg, 
2020b). Also, according to the Bloomberg (2020a) report, the GPFG’s return has suffered 
less than other funds from the COVID-19 pandemic, thanks to its ethical investment 
strategy. 
 
Another strength of the GPFG is its transparency. The legal framework of the GPFG is 
clearly set by the Government Pension Fund Act No. 123 of 21 December 2005, which 
includes the purpose of the Fund, management of the fund, specification of the income to 
the fund, and the use of the capital of the fund, and it is easily accessible for the public 





The weakness of the GPFG is the fact that its accumulation is based on the revenue from 
fossil fuel productions which are non-sustainable and environmentally unjust. In 2017, the 
Norway's Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has announced its new offshore licensing 
round consisting of 102 blocks, 9 in the Norwegian Sea and 93 in the Barents Sea, which 
is a part of the Artic Sea. The  Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Terje Søviknes, said: 
“Profitable petroleum activity is important to maintain our welfare and the further 
development of our society.” (Marex, 2017, para 3). This means that Norway has to keep 
damaging and exploiting natural resources to continue supporting the social welfare of 
Norwegian people using the GPFG. The expanding petroleum activity is accompanied by 
environmental impacts which can damage the Norwegian public, workers in fisheries, and 
people in other countries in the world due to potential threats of oil spills and greenhouse 
gas emissions. For example, Tol (2019) has estimated the long-term damage caused by 
climate change that is called the “social cost of carbon” (SCC), and has found out that 
poorer countries are more vulnerable to climate change, especially when governments 
prioritized their countries’ benefits without being responsible for global climate change. 
Paul et al.(2017) also estimated the SCC, and found out the SCC of Norway is lower than 
of other developed countries, such as Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States (U.S.). Based on their calculation, the SCC of Norway in 2030 is valued at 
$106 per ton while the SCC of Sweden is $168 per ton, the SCC of Germany is $171, and 
the SCC of US is $118 per ton. This is unjust when considering that Norway has a high 
carbon footprint because Norway is the seventh-largest CO2 exporter (Kaye, 2017; 
McKinnon et al., 2017). Due to these facts, SWFs funded by fossil fuel revenues such as 





Patton (2012) pointed out that one of the opportunities of a SWF is providing liquidity of 
capital for achieving long-term goals. The GPFG provides Norway the opportunity to 
reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, and this is called “a Norwegian Paradox”. Norway is 
aiming to shrink its own carbon emissions by 40 percent, however, Norway has sought to 
reduce its carbon footprint without reducing their oil production (Sengupta, 2017). For 
example, Norway planned to sell only electric cars by 2025 with support from attractive 
government subsidies (Sengupta, 2017). They also have funded to fight against the global 
deforestation with GPFG support, according to the Fund’s ethical guidelines for responsible 
investment (Rainforest Foundation Norway, 2019). In March 2019, they announced that 
GPFG will dump stocks in 134 companies that explore for oil and gas, and will begin to 
invest in renewable energy infrastructure projects (Digges, 2019b, 2019a). These efforts 




A major threat could be the aging population of Norway. The rapid aging of the Norwegian 
population could result in escalating pension payments. As stated in the Eifert, Gelb, and 
Tallroth (2002) study, long-term demographic projections suggest that escalating pensions 
payments and health care expenditures for the elderly with the rapid aging of the Norwegian 
72 
 
population will coincide with tapering off of Norway’s oil export income, as Norwegian 
oil reserves are expected to be exhausted over decades (Eifert et al., 2002). The Norwegian 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2016) also pointed out that the aging population 




Table 3. The SWOT Matrix for the Case Study of Norway 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Strong accumulation from stable 
composition and low spending rate 
- Transparency 
- Capacity to deal with economic shocks 
- Non-sustainable sources of the fund  
- Environmental injustice 
Opportunities Threats 
- Investment opportunities to recover 
sustainability 
- Risks embedded in equity investments 
- Escalating pensions payments 
 
Table 3 summarizes the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the GPFG 
identified on this chapter.    
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Norway has adopted a good framework to transform oil revenue into wealth of the 
Norwegian people. The key factors of the success of the GPFG are: creating an ownership 
share for government from the early stage of oil and gas development, based on the social 
values of equality and integrity, with large savings from oil revenue (about 50%) and less 
spending than its average annual return. Although Norway has established a solid fund 
amount already, the source of the SWF has fundamental weaknesses, namely that the fund 
has been built on the cost of exploitation of fossil fuels, which has a significant contribution 
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to the global warming problem. Norway is trying to compensate this negative contribution 
by investing in clean technologies, such as electric cars, renewable energy, and fighting to 
stop global deforestation.  
 
The experience of Norway shows how to create and manage a SWF for long-term 
prosperity build upon resource revenues. The accumulation framework for the GPFG 
provides a good example of how to establish a solid SWF by using oil revenue. Its drastic 
saving pattern, however, was possible due to timely and forceful intervention by the 
government based on the country’s social values of equity and integrity. Therefore, how to 
achieve a social consensus on those drastic saving measures that could limit the benefits to 
the current generation will be key to introducing this model for other governments as the 
difficulty of social consensus makes very difficult to sell politically. In addition, investment 
strategies must be made to ensure long term sustainability, as its accumulation is based on 
climate change. The fund should be operated to lower the risk of volatility of the oil prices 
and to ensure environmental sustainability in the long term.  
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5. Case Study 2: Alaska 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The first discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil field in 1968 has brought profound economic 
and social changes for everyone in Alaska (Marks, 2017; Mikkelsen et al., 2008). The 
economy of Alaska has become significantly dependent on the oil and gas industry, and the 
interaction between the community near the oil field and the outside world has increased 
(Mikkelsen et al., 2008). The government of Alaska established its own Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (SWF) in 1976 because they knew the windfall of oil and gas development would be 
temporary and wanted to make sure everyone in Alaska gained benefits from it (Widerquist 
& Howard, 2012b). When the government of Alaska decided to establish the SWF in 
Alaska, they took a different path from Norway especially about how to spend the savings 
from resource revenues. SWFs can have different objectives, such as economic 
development, economic diversification, saving surpluses of resource revenue, or growing 
wealth for the future generations (UN Environment, 2018). For the government of Alaska, 
the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) has been an important way of contributing to individual 
freedom of the public as well as sharing resource revenue (Carter, 2012; Casassas & 
Wispelaere, 2012). The idea of the regular dividend of the APF has been  influenced by the 
movement for basic income discussed widely in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Widerquist & Howard, 2012b). The residents of Alaska have benefited from the oil and 
gas industry by receiving an annual grant called the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) from 
APF, while most countries having a SWF usually seek to maximize financial returns for 
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the long-term policies (Bernstein et al., 2013). However, there are concerns about the 
sustainability and stability of the PFD although the APF is renowned as a successful case 
of SWF (Goldsmith, 2012; Guettabi, 2019; Marks, 2017). 
 
5.2. Alaska’s SWF: The Alaska Permanent Fund  
In 1968, the Prudhoe Bay oil field, the largest oil field in North America, was discovered 
on the North Slope of Alaska. The discovery precipitated profound changes for everyone 
in Alaska in terms of economic and social development (Mikkelsen et al., 2008). Before 
the discovery, the economy of Alaska had been dependent on federal government spending. 
In 1960, the government and military employments accounted for 57% of employment in 
Alaska, and construction employments, which accounted for 6% of employment in Alaska, 
were mostly under government contracts (Cliff Groh & Erickson, 2012). The North Slope 
area is the traditional territory of Inupiat, a group of Alaska Natives who used the area for 
hunting, fishing, travel, and other subsistence activities.  
 
In 1969, after oil discovery, there was a big capital inflow to Alaska, and a North Slope 
lease sale was about 5 times the annual budget of Alaska (Kasson, 1997). The government 
of Alaska spent the revenue from the lease sale to build the infrastructure required for the 
future oil and gas development, schools, loan programs for college students, and the other 
needs for future development. However, Alaskans knew the windfalls from oil and gas 
resources would be temporary and they may have little benefit because they had 
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experiences of being exploited by outside interests for Alaska’s fur, fisheries and mineral 
resources (Cliff Groh & Erickson, 2012; Widerquist & Howard, 2012b). There were also 
growing concerns about the expected damage to wildlife, marine resources, and other 
subsistence values (Mikkelsen et al., 2008). 
 
The production of the oil field was expected to start in 1973, however, it was delayed until 
1977 because of political and economic angst. During the 4 years of delay, Alaskans 
discussed and voted about what they wanted to do with the benefits of oil and gas 
development (Cliff Groh & Erickson, 2012). As a result, a primary consensus was reached 
for saving the oil money in a fund, and the consensus led to the creation of a separate fund 
to save oil and gas revenue (Cliff Groh & Erickson, 2012). In 1976, the constitutional 
amendment to establish the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) was passed by the voters of 
Alaska. The amendment required the dedication of income-related oil production to the 
fund by the following:  
At least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale 
proceeds, federal mineral revenue-sharing payments and bonuses received by the 
state shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principal of which shall be used only 
for those income-producing investments specifically designated by law as eligible 
for permanent fund investments. All income from the permanent fund shall be 
deposited in the General Fund unless otherwise provided by law. 
(Alaska Permanent Fund Amendment, 1976, Section 15) 
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This amendment included the idea of how to build the fund from a portion of mineral 
income, but it did not specify the policy purpose for expenditure (Anderson, 2002). Over 
the next 3 years, a study commission had discussions about the purpose of the fund 
(Anderson, 2002). This led to the establishment of a state-owned corporation to manage the 
APF, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, and created legislation which in 1980 
articulated the purpose of the APF as follows: 
 1. the Fund should provide a means of conserving a portion of the state’s revenue 
from mineral resources to benefit all generations of Alaskans. 
2. the Fund’s goal should be to maintain safety of the principal while maximizing 
total return. 
3. the Fund should be used as a savings device managed to allow the maximum use 
of disposable income from the Fund for purposes designated by law. 
(Alaska Statutes 37.13.020., 1980) 
Meanwhile, Jay Hammond, Alaska’s governor from 1974 to 1982, was concerned that the 
APF could be spent by politicians in a way that does not benefit everyone in Alaska, 
including the future generations (Marks, 2017). Thus, he promoted the idea to directly give 
the money to the residents of Alaska in the form of dividends; thus, individuals could decide 
how to utilize the money (Kasson, 1997; Marks, 2017). In 1982, the legislation authorizing 
equal dividend payments to the residents living in Alaska for more than six months was 
approved, and the first dividend checks were distributed. The first payment was $1,000, 
and since the following year, the dividend has been calculated as 21% of the net income of 
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the APF for the last five fiscal years. The current deposit of the APF is comprised of a non-
spendable part and a spendable (assigned) part. The non-spendable part of the APF is 
invested in various assets, such as public equities, private equities, real estate, and the 
assigned part of the APF is assigned to Alaskans by the Alaska State Legislature and the 
governor. The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation transfers about 50% of the income 
available to the APF for dividend payments.  
 
 
5.3 The Sustainability of Alaska’s Oil and Gas Industry 
 
5.3.1 The Oil and Gas Industry and Financial Capital 
Alaska's economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas industry. The oil and gas industry 
in Alaska accounts for a 21% share of the total GDP of Alaska, with $11.0 billions of 
contribution to GDP in 2017 (Sauter, 2019). Including all taxes and royalties levied on the 
oil and gas industry, the government of Alaska received $447 million from the oil and gas 
industry in 2016, which is about 26% of the total tax revenue (McDowell Group, 2017). 
During the same period, the mining industry paid $81 million in mining royalties to the 
state government, which is about 4.5% of the total tax revenue (McDowell Group, 2017). 
With the fluid cash flow from the oil and gas industry, Alaska is the only state in the US 




With the solid earnings reserve and principal (corpus), the value of the APF reached over 
$66.30 billion as of June 30, 2019 (Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, 2019b). In 2018, 
the dividend was paid to 639,247 residents of Alaska, which is about 87% of the total 
population of Alaska (Table 4). The residents of Alaska, including minors with a sponsor, 
are entitled to receive the dividend if they are not absent from Alaska for more than 180 
days and not sentenced as a result of a conviction of a felony. The amount of the annual 
dividend (PFD), usually ranging from roughly $1,000 to $2,000 (see Table 4), is adjusted 
to preserve the dividend program. For example, the amount of the dividend per person in 
2009 was nearly 60% that of the dividend in 2008, because of the US economic crisis from 
2008 to 2009 (Erickson & Barker, 2015). Also, the amount of the dividend per person in 
2016 was nearly 50% that of the dividend in 2015 and has since remained lower than before 
2016, in response to Alaska's fiscal crisis from the depressed oil prices (Walker, 2018). 
Furthermore, there was a bad evolution in the industry, when British Petroleum (BP), which 
had been the central player in the development of the Prudhoe Bay oil field and the pipeline 
which moves oil for export at the Port of Valdez, announced the sale of its Alaska 
operations in August 2019 (Cunningham, 2019; Harball, 2019). BP sold its Alaska 
operations to Hilcorp Energy Co, and about 200 people lost their jobs (Anchorage 





Table 4. The APF Balances and Dividends  

























$1,000 $386 $331 $404 $556 $708 $827 $873 $952 $930 
Application 
Paid 
470,897 458,213 482,135 519,413 533,315 530,594 519,724 508,710 498,447 512,764 
State 
Population 
464,300 499,100 524,000 543,900 550,700 541,300 535,000 538,900 553,171 569,054 

























$916 $949 $984 $990 $1,131 $1,297 $1,541 $1,770 $1,964 $1,850 
Application 
Paid 
523,099 528,399 535,178 542,397 546,651 555,289 565,657 573,324 583,633 586,848 
State 
Population 
586,722 596,906 600,622 601,581 605,212 609,655 617,082 622,000 627,533 632,241 
























1 person  
$1,541 $1,108 $920 $846 $1,107 $1,654 $2,069 $1,305 $1,281 $1,174 
Application 
Paid 
590,031 596,176 599,992 597,639 595,166 600,278 616,484 624,888 637,873 644,959 
State 
Population 
640,544 647,747 656,834 663,253 670,053 674,510 679,720 692,314 710,231 722,190 






















$878.0 $900.0 $1,884 $2,072 $1,022 $1,100 $1,600 $1,606 
Application 
Paid 
641,644 634,366 637,289 641,561 638,178 633,005 639,247 - 
State 
Population 
732,298 736,399 735,601 737,625 739,828 737,847 736,239   
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Source. Data from Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (2019), Alaska Department of 
Revenue (2020) 
-) No data 
 
 
The annual earnings from the fund are used for both current generations and future 
generations. The sources of the earnings come from three different cash flows: royalties, 
appropriations, and inflation proofing. From the inception of the fund in 1978 to 2019, 41.5% 
of the fund’s principal came from the oil and gas portion, 41.6% of the fund came from 
appropriations, and 16.9% came from inflation proofing transfers (Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corportation, 2019, p. 7). When it comes to the use of the fund’s earnings, 42.5% of the 
fund earning is paid out to current generations either by dividend (37.3%) and the general 
fund (dividend distribution to fund various agency activities, 5.2%), and the rest, 57.5%, is 
saved for future generations by inflation proofing (26.4%), special appropriations (6.6%), 
and undistributed realized income since the inception of the fund (Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corportation, 2019, p. 1).  
 
 
5.3.2 The Oil and Gas Industry and Produced Capitals 
 
Alaska is the sixth-largest producer of crude oil among all US states. In 2017, about 80% 
of the crude oil produced in Alaska was transported to refineries in Washington and 
83 
 
California (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018a). Another 15% of the crude oil 
was refined in refineries in Alaska, and 5% of the crude oil was shipped to Hawaii or  other 
countries (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018a). Most of Alaska's crude oil 
production occurs on the North Slope of Alaska. In 2019, the oil fields on North Slope 
produced nearly 451 thousand barrels per day and the oil fields on South Alaska coast 
produced only 14 thousand barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2020a). The oil produced on the North Slope was transported through the Trans Alaska 
Pipeline System (TAPS). Shortly after the discovery of Prudhoe Bay oil field, the Pipeline 
field study team from Atlantic Richfield Company-Humble North Slope Coordinating 
Committee arrived in Alaska in 1968 and made an agreement for “a planning study and for 
engineering design and construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline Project”(Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company, 2013, p. 81). The operation of the pipeline started in 1977, and 
it can carry more than 2 million barrels of oil per day (Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 





Figure 5. Crude Oil Production in Alaska 
Sources. Data from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019) 
 
The annual crude oil production in Alaska peaked in 1988, and steadily has declined since 
that peak (see Figure 5). The improved drilling efficiency increased oil production slightly 
in 2002, however, annual oil production declined again since 2003 as the oil fields matured 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018a). Daily crude oil production in Alaska in 
2018 was about 518,400 barrels which is significantly lower than its peak of 2 million 




































































































Figure 6. Alaska Crude Oil Proven Reserve 
Sources. Data from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019) 
 
Although the proven crude oil reserve in Alaska is steadily falling (see Figure 6), the state  
still has an estimated 50 to 60 BBbls of oil undeveloped yet on the North Slope and in the 
Alaskan Arctic (Clemente, 2019). However, these reserves consist of heavy oil, light oil 
from small and remote fields, and natural gas liquids which are more challenging to develop 
and are mostly located where access has been hindered either by federal policy or 
environmental regulations (Clemente, 2019; Resource Development Council, n.d.). Despite 
the cost, Alaska has invested billions of dollars in new oil reserve explorations and 










































































































forecast that global crude oil price will rise in the mid-/long-term (Clemente, 2019; 
Resource Development Council, n.d.). Alaska also has natural gas reserves totaled at 3.3 
trillion cubic feet, however, there is no pipeline to transport the natural gas to consumers 
and most of the gas is reinjected into oil fields to increase the efficiency of oil production 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018a). 
 
 
5.3.3 The Oil and Gas Industry and Natural Capitals 
 
Oil spills have been the worst manmade disasters for the environment in Alaska (Sylves & 
Comfort, 2012), which is well known for its unique wilderness (30% of US wilderness 
area). On March 24, 1989, an oil tanker vessel called Exxon Valdez crashed into the Bligh 
Reef in Prince William Sound in Alaska. It is estimated that about 257,000 barrels of crude 
oil had been spilled out of its total 53 million barrels cargo, and 1,300 miles of shoreline 
were contaminated by the crude oil (Sylves & Comfort, 2012). This was the worst oil spill 
accident in U.S history before the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill accident in coastal 
Louisiana in 2010.  
 
This accident caused significant damage to the marine ecosystem. The actual damages are 
hard to know, as the environment has not recovered yet, and there were not enough studies 
about the correlation between oil exposure and mortality of fishes (Barley, 2012; Ferreira, 
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2015; Incardona et al., 2015). According to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustees Council, 
the best estimation is that 250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald 
eagles, 22 killer whales, and billions of salmon and herring eggs were killed by the accident 
(Trustee Council, 2010).  
 
Correspondingly, the fishery and fishing industry in Alaska has suffered considerably. 
Fisheries for some major species, such as salmon, herring, shrimp, and rockfish, were 
closed for a considerable period, and herring and salmon never fully recovered (Leahy, 
2019; Sylves & Comfort, 2012). The collapse of the herring population, especially, has 
induced bankruptcy for fishermen (Leahy, 2019). Incardona et al. (2015) have found out 
that embryos of herring and salmons can be damaged irreversibly even with low level of 
oil exposure, and the damages on nearshore spawning fish from the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
have been underestimated in terms of the geographic extent of affected habitats and the 
level of toxicity (Incardona et al., 2015). Therefore, the actual damage of the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill is likely to be greater than what it is known. 
 
Alaska's oil and gas industry also contributes significantly to increasing the state's carbon 
emission. The industrial activities of the oil and gas industry have represented over 50% of 
the sources of greenhouse gas emissions in Alaska (see Table 5). The oil and gas industry 
is not only the major source of carbon dioxide but also a major source of methane, which 
has 104 times the global warming potential compared to CO2. Fugitive methane, mostly 
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generated from oil production, contributed over 19% of the greenhouse gas emitted by the 
oil and gas industry in 2015 (Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, 2018).  
 
Table 5. Greenhouse gas emissions to air in Alaska 1990 - 2015 (unit: MMT CO2e) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total 44.93 46.55 47.09 46.25 46.07 49.67 51.13 50.43 51.21 50.83 
Oil and Gas 24.85 26.53 27.83 27.43 26.59 29.43 30.08 28.27 28.32 26.73 
O&G/Total 55.3% 57.0% 59.1% 59.3% 57.7% 59.3% 58.8% 56.1% 55.3% 52.6% 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total 51.16 50.07 50.98 51.21 52.66 54.64 50.92 49.45 44.81 41.88 
Oil and Gas 26.30 26.36 26.88 26.52 25.61 26.99 23.19 23.34 21.30 21.00 
O&G/Total 51.4% 52.6% 52.7% 51.8% 48.6% 49.4% 45.5% 47.2% 47.5% 50.1% 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Total 43.04 43.34 42.63 40.88 39.01 41.3 
 Oil and Gas 20.22 22.63 22.33 22.10 20.96 22.33 
O&G/Total 47.0% 52.2% 52.4% 54.1% 53.7% 54.1% 
Source. Data from (Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, 2018) 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change, and climate change causes actual damages 
to the sustainability of society through changes in agricultural productivity, human health 
risk, increased flood risk, energy system cost (heating and cooling systems cost), or other 
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environmental damages (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). The 
value of the long-term damage caused by climate change in a given year is called social 
cost of carbon (SCC). The estimated values of SCC can vary depending on various factors 
such as income level, geographic location, economic sectors, or estimation methods 
(Pindyck, 2019). The US government’s Interagency Working Group (IWG) on the Social 
Cost of Greenhouse Gases estimated that the SCC of CO2 emissions in US is about $50 
/metric tonne of CO2/year (in 2017 dollars) (Paul et al., 2017). Based on this estimation of 
the SCC, the oil and gas industry in Alaska is responsible for the $1,115.5 million SCC for 
the greenhouse gas emissions in 2015 ($50 per metric ton × 22.33 million metric ton of 
emissions in 2015 (see Table 5)). This is a smaller amount than the total dividend paid in 
2015 which is about $1,329.3 million ($2,072 per person × 641,561 application paid in 
2015 (Table 4)). On the other hand, Pindyck (2019) asserts that the SCC estimation done 
by the IWG is too low and proposed a much higher estimation, in the range of  $80 to $200. 
Then the total SCC that the oil and gas industry is responsible for would be in a range from 
$1,786.4 million to $4,466 million, which is much higher than the total dividends paid in 
2015. Therefore, the SCC can be a reason why the oil and gas industry in Alaska should 
contribute to the sustainability of Alaska. 
 
Also, there is another issue related to the SCC. The climate change damage from the 
greenhouse gas emissions from the oil and gas industry in Alaska is not limited to Alaska, 
as climate change has a global impact. Different countries have different SCC, and the SCC 
is generally larger in low-income countries with large populations, as they are more 
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vulnerable to climate change (Paul et al., 2017; Tol, 2019). For this reason, the national 
SCC can be much smaller than the global SCC in many countries (Tol, 2019). Therefore, 
the impact of Alaska's oil and gas industry on the natural capital should be calculated 
considering that it has global impacts rather than regional ones. 
 
 
5.3.4 The Oil and Gas Industry and Human Capital 
 
There are a few ways in which Alaska's oil and gas industry contributes to human capital 
formation. The first one is by creating jobs in oil and gas companies. In 2016, 4,275 
Alaskans worked for companies in oil and gas production, transportation, and refining of 
oil and gas (McDowell Group, 2017). Also, 6,095 Alaskans worked in oil and gas support 
service companies, and 35,205 Alaskans worked in other indirect and induced companies 
(McDowell Group, 2017). Total employment in the oil and gas industry is  45,575, and it 
accounts for 14% of the total employment in Alaska, considering that there were 323,500 
jobs in Alaska in 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). However, the number of those 
employed in the oil and gas industry in 2016 was stagnant compared to the number of 




Table 6. Alaska Oil and Gas Industry Employment 
 2010 2013 2016 
Primary Companies 3,997 4,700 4,275 
Oil and Gas Support 
Services 
7,670 8,400 6,095 
Indirect and Induced 
Employment 
34,133 37,900 35,205 
Total 44,800 51,000 45,575 
Source. Data for 2010 from MCDowell Group (2011), Data for 2013 from McDowell 
Group (2014), Data for 2016 from McDowell Group (2017) 
Note, Primary companies include companies in oil and gas production, transportation, and 
refining of oil and gas 
 
The oil and gas industry also contributes to preserving human capital in Alaska through 
several statewide government programs for the oil and gas industry. According to the 
analysis of the McDowell Group (2017), 90% of the budget for the Alaska Department of 
Education and Early Development, spent for students in public schools, which is about 
$1.1billion, originated from oil and gas revenue, and $575 million out of a total of $1.7 
billion of the budget for the federally administered health insurance program has originated 
from oil and gas revenue in 2016.  
 
On the other hand, there have been concerns that direct cash transfers from the APF may 
discourage employment (Guettabi, 2019). The studies on the relationship between APF and 
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employment supply/demand, however, affirm that there is no need to worry about the 
effects. Bibler, Guettabi, and Reimer (2019) have found out that a $1,000 increase of the 
PFD per person induces a decrease in the size of the labor market by 0.7% in the following 
month of the PFD disbursement. However, the annual labor market size decreases only by 
0.2%, that is to say, the effect is driven by transitory reductions (Bibler et al., 2019). 
Feinberg and Kuehn (2018) also investigated how the PFD impacted the number of hours 
worked. They have also found out a decline in the number of hours worked, especially in 
the married-women group, but overall the effects were modest and the decrease in income 
from the decline in hours worked were smaller than the increased income from the PFD 
(Feinberg & Kuehn, 2018). Jones and Marinescu (2018) also examined the long-run effect 
of PFD on the Alaska labor market and found out no significant effect on employment, 
except that the proportion of part-time employees in the overall labor market has increased 
by 1.8%. Meanwhile, Kurland (2017) asserted that the PFD encourages people in rural 
areas to move to a bigger city and find a job. The author claimed that this was because the 
PFD alleviated the constraint of costs of migration and stimulated the creation of new jobs 
due to the increase in the aggregate demand for goods and services (Kurland, 2017). This 
argument can be supported by the findings of Feinberg and Kuehn (2019) that the amount 
of the PFD had significant positive impacts on entrepreneurship and small-firm entry. 
Putting these studies together, it appears that there seems to not exist enough empirical 
evidence for the concerns that the direct cash transfer from the APF may discourage the 





5.3.5 The Oil and Gas Industry and Social Capital 
 
Alaska became a territory of the US in 1867. Most of the inhabitants in the area were Native 
people. Northern Alaska, which accounts for most of Alaska's oil and gas production, had 
been used for hunting areas for the Native peoples for a thousand years (Mikkelsen et al., 
2008). When the US began developing oil and gas resources on Alaska’s North Slope, the 
Native people were awarded rights to a portion of the land and granted about 1billion USD 
to benefit Native stakeholders, based on the rights guaranteed by the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) (Mikkelsen et al., 2008). The Native communities have 
received royalties and land rents through the Native associations in their area, such as the 
NANA Regional Corporation, the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, the Bering Straits 
Association, or the Association of Village Council Presidents. There is a total of 13 Native 
associations created by the ANCSA.  
 
5.4 SWOT Analysis  
1) Strengths 
The first strength of the APF is its high transparency in both the administration of the APF 
and in its investments (Hartzok, 2012). The public can easily navigate the information on 
the APF and the annual dividend and ask questions to the Alaska Permanent Fund 
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Corporation (APFC). Also, they can access annual reports on fund earnings, portfolios, 
investment details, and the financial statements of the APF.  
 
Another strength of the APF is the unique framework for revenue distribution. Alaskan 
residents who are qualified for the dividends are entitled to the same payment regardless of 
their income. This means that the APF grants an equal share of the natural capitals in Alaska 
to the public (Cummine, 2013). The PFD contributes significantly to income distribution. 
Thanks to this mechanism, the PFD has contributed to lessening poverty in Alaska. Alaska 
ranks 4th in Poverty Rate in the USA at 10.2%, which is significantly lower than the 
national average of 14.6% (Welfareinfo, 2017). According to Berman and Reamey (2016), 
the APF has saved 15,000 to 25,000 Alaskans from poverty annually, which means it has 
reduced the poverty rate of Alaska by an average of 2.3% between 2010 and 2015. The 
PFD is especially important in reducing poverty, especially for rural, Native, and senior 
Alaskans (Berman & Reamey, 2016).  
 
2) Weaknesses 
The first weakness of the APF is the current dependency of funding source on non-
sustainable resources. Without diversifying its source, the oil and gas production in Alaska 
has to be continued to maintain the APF; however, the annual oil production amount has 
gradually declined since the peak in 1988. Although Alaska still has an estimated reserve 
of 50 to 60 BBbls of oil undeveloped, and has drilled actively to develop its oil reserves, 
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there are several restrictions for the development, such as high development costs on 
remote fields, and federal policy regulations, such as the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act, to protect ocean environment from waste generated 
at the oil well site and water pollutants (Clemente, 2019; Resource Development Council, 
n.d.).  
 
The second weakness of the APF is that its accumulation is based on the revenue from 
fossil fuel production which destroys natural capitals and the danger of oil spills that brings 
mortal damages to the Alaska Ocean. As such, in Norway, oil production has been a major 
source of greenhouse gas emissions and deterioration of the ocean ecosystem. While 
Norway has tried to compensate for the environmental damage with investments in 
reducing carbon footprints, Alaska lacks such movement. The lack of a green tax paradigm 
shift is the major weakness of the APF, which is frequently criticized by environmentalists 
(Hartzok, 2012). 
 
The third weakness is environmental injustice arising from its revenue-generating process. 
Like in the case of Norway, oil and gas development in Alaska contribute to different levels  
of SCC between different countries, and it is higher in less-developed countries even 
though the benefits of the development are mostly taken by Alaska (Tol, 2019). Also, the 
climate change is more damaging to Alaska’s wilderness and to the Native communities, 
while the most reserves of oil and gas in Alaska are on the North Slope, the homeland of 
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Native communities. Most Native communities are located along coastlines and rivers, 
which makes them more susceptible to flood and erosion (Talberth & Wysham, 2017). In 
addition, rural Alaskan Natives rely on hunting and fishing economically and nutritionally, 
there is a decrease in the amount of wildlife due to climate change (Talberth & Wysham, 
2017). Hence, they are more vulnerable to the climate change than the other Alaskan people 
or US citizens. 
 
3) Opportunities 
Recently, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) began to expand the investment 
in the private market to boost the returns of the APF and launch an in-state investment 
program, the Alaska Investment Program, in September 2019. The Alaska statutes 
37.13.120. specifies the rule of investment for the APF, which is:  
"The board shall invest the assets of the fund in in-state investments to the extent 
that in-state investments are available and if the in-state investments have a risk 
level and expected return comparable to alternate investment opportunities" 
(Alaska Statutes, 2018, 37.13.120. (a))  
With this requirement, the Alaska Investment Program is managed by two external fund 
managers and targets a rate of return and expected risk comparable to investments outside 
of Alaska with an initial allocation of $200 million (Alaska Statutes, 2018). About 73% of 





With the high dependency on annual oil and gas revenue, without income tax and sales tax, 
the big external threat to the APF is the crude oil price fluctuations. For instance, the PFD 
in 2016 was slashed almost 50% with the plunge of crude oil price and reduced state 
revenues by more than 80% (Walker, 2018). The PFD in 2009 also was slashed by nearly 
60% in 2008, due to the plunge in crude oil price with the US economic crisis from 2008 
to 2009. Meanwhile, Alaska has tried to develop new oil and gas resources to boost their 
oil and gas production; however, opening new oil fields in Alaska requires more investment 
than developing onshore shale resources in other states in the U.S (Paraskova, 2017). The 
oil company BP decided to exit Alaska in August 2019 due to the recent low productivity 
of the oil and gas in Alaska, and plans to focus on crude oil production from other US shale 
fields (Cunningham, 2019). While its short-term effect is not critical, as the operation is 
going to be continued by the Hilcorp Energy Co and a number of BP workers have been 
hired by other local firms (Anchorage Economic Development Corporation, 2020), the 
future of the oil and gas industry in Alaska seems to be gloomy. The main reasons why BP 
left Alaska were the falling oil production in Alaska and the higher profitability of US tight 
oil assets (Cunningham, 2019). Alaskan oil production on North Slope will be expected to 
decline, according to the State Department of Revenue, and the Trump administration’s 




Table 7. The SWOT Matrix for the Case Study of Alaska 
Strengths Weakness 
- Income distribution  
- Lower poverty rate  
- Transparency 
- High dependency on annual oil and gas revenue 
- Non-sustainable sources of the fund 
- Environmental damage and injustice 
Opportunities Threats 
- In-state investments - Low crude oil price and its volatility 
 
Table 7 summarizes the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the APF 
identified on this chapter.    
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Alaska’s SWF gives the public the right to the natural capital’s wealth in Alaska by granting 
annual dividends to the public. The revenue distribution framework has helped alleviate the 
danger of the “resource curse” in Alaska. This dividend has become an important share of 
population’s income especially for low-income households and has had positive impacts 
on small business entry in Alaska (Feinberg & Kuehn, 2018; Kurland, 2017). Similar to 
Norway’s SWF, the APF is funded by non-renewable resources, which raises issues on 
sustainability and environmental injustice, as the process of oil and gas production 
deteriorates the ocean environment and emits greenhouse gases. While Norway is trying to 
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diversify its portfolio by including global assets and assets related to clean technologies, 
Alaska invests more in domestic assets so they can have a more competitive economy. 
Because Alaska’s SWF has invested more to current generation than Norway's GPFG, the 
Fund has been greatly affected by the recent decline in oil prices and decreases in oil 
production. Alaska’s SWF framework constitutes an interesting case study of basic income 
as well. The APF shows how income distribution to the public from oil revenues, which 
could have been owned by oil companies, has a positive effect on the local economy 
provided that distributed income stays in the local economy as investments.  
 
5.6 Summary of the Norwegian Model and the Alaskan Model 
 
The sustainability issue of the natural resource funds boils down to a trade-off between the 
welfare of current generations and of future generations (A Bauer et al., 2016; Eckardt et 
al., 2012) Both the Norwegian GPFG and the Alaskan APF originally aimed to prevent the 
“resource curse” and ensure the sustainability of the society based on oil revenue 
distribution. However, they have differences in the approach concerning the ways to 
distribute the revenue to the current generations and the future generations in their societies.  
 
The Norway government collects a 27% corporate income tax and an additional 51% 
special tax from oil and gas companies (as of 2018). The government accumulates the 
special tax in the GPFG fund, and invests in equities, fixed income, and real estate, and 
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spends it under the expected investment return formula which is generally 3% to 4% of the 
fund (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2019a; Poelzer, 2015). The government in 
Alaska collects at least 25% every year from oil and gas companies’ revenues, and about 
50% of the fund earnings (42.5% as of 2019) is paid out as an annual dividend to the current 
generations in Alaska (Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, 2019, p. 1). The rest is saved 
as a non-spendable fund for future generations. As to the revenue distribution between the 
current generation and future generations, Norway saves more financial capital from the 
current generation and leaves more share in the form of pensions for future generations. 
Also, The GPFG helps Norway deal with economic shocks because of its strong 
accumulation and stable composition. Alaska spends more on current generations in the 
form of a type of basic income than Norway. Consequently, Norway’s GPFG has a more 
stable and considerable amount compared to Alaska’s APF. Alaska’s APF, however, 
contributes directly to lessening the poverty in Alaska as it provides a current basic income. 
 
Both the GPFG and the APF are sourced from non-sustainable sources which are oil and 
gas, therefore, they need to prepare a post-petroleum plan to sustain their economies to 
escape from the extrnal threat regarding non-sustainability of current sources. This is more 
problematic in Alaska due to the APF’s high dependency on annual oil and gas revenue. 
To sustain their development with their SWF, the income from the GPFG and the APF is 
invested in various assets, not only in equities and real estate but also in social infrastructure. 
The main difference in investment strategies between the two funds is that the GPFG has 
invested in global companies, real estates, and equities, including in sectors to offset the 
101 
 
harm from environmental degradation from the production and use of oil and gas, while 
the APF has invested more in domestic sectors, such as liquid stocks, bonds, and 
infrastructures across industries with particular emphasis on software, healthcare, and 
financial services sectors (Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, 2019a). Regarding the 
threats to the SWFs, the threats to Norway’s GPFG are mostly from macroeconomic trends, 
while the threats to Alaska’s APF are especially from crude oil prices’ volatility due to its 





Table 8. Summary of the SWOT Analysis 
 Strengths Weakness 
Norway 
- Strong accumulation from stable 
composition  
– Low spending rate 
- Transparency 
- Capacity to deal with economic 
shocks 
- Non-sustainable sources of the fund 
- Environmental injustice 
Alaska 
- More equitable distribution of 
income   
- Ability to lessen current poverty rate 
- Transparency 
- Non-sustainable sources of the fund 
- Environmental injustice 
- High dependency on annual oil and 
gas revenue 
 Opportunities Threats 
Norway 
- Investment opportunities to recover 
sustainability 
- Risks embedded in equity 
investments 
- Escalating pensions payments 






6. Addressing Sustainability Challenges in Newfoundland and Labrador and Its Oil 
and Gas Industry 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The province of Newfoundland and Labrador is located on the east coast of Canada, and is 
composed of the island of Newfoundland and a mainland sector, Labrador. The population 
of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador was a total of 521,542 in 2019, but is 
steadily falling from the highest population in 1992, which was 580,109 inhabitants 
(Newfoundland & Labrador Statistics Agency, 2019). One of the major reasons for the 
declining population is the loss of youth to other provinces, as the unemployment rate in 
the province (13.8% in 2018) is much higher than the national unemployment rate of 5.8%  
in 2018 (Government of Canada, 2020). The unemployment rate has been higher than most 
provinces in Canada since the Cod moratorium in 1992, which resulting in about 34,000 
job lost (Gien, 2000). The oil and gas industry is the backbone of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador economy, as it is the biggest sector amongst all industries in terms of industrial 
gross output. In 2016, the gross output of the oil and gas industry, including the oil and gas 
extraction sector, support activities for oil and gas extraction sector, and oil and gas 
engineering construction sector, was $11,557.8 million, which is about 21% of the total 
industrial gross output of all industries in NL, which was $54,644.8 million (Statistics 
Canada, 2020). Considering that the industrial gross output of the total manufacturing 
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industry was $5,185.3 million (Statistics Canada, 2020), the economy of Newfoundland 
and Labrador is highly dependent on the oil and gas industry. Because of this dependency, 
Newfoundland and Labrador is the most affected Canadian province when there is a 
negative trend in the oil and gas industry market with large welfare losses and is vulnerable 
to the “resource curse” (Carbone & McKenzie, 2016; Reid & Collins, 2012). In this chapter, 
how the province of Newfoundland and Labrador should use its oil revenues to contribute 
to its sustainable growth by using a SWF framework is discussed, based on the case studies 
of Norway and the US state of Alaska. 
 
 
6.2 Oil and Gas Industry and Capitals in Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
6.2.1 The Oil and Gas Industry and Financial Capital 
As of 2020, there are four oil projects offshore Newfoundland and Labrador, which are the 
Hibernia project, operated by Hibernia Management and Development Company Ltd, the 
Terra Nova project, operated by Suncor Energy, the White Rose project, operated by Husky 
Energy, and the Hebron project, operated by ExxonMobil Canada which is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Exxon Mobil Corporation in US The oil and gas companies operating the 
projects are charged a 15% corporate income tax, a rent-based tax and a royalty. The rent-
based tax and royalty are determined based on an R factor which is calculated as: R= 
(cumulative gross sales revenue and incidental revenue, less cumulative transportation 
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costs, less cumulative basic and net royalty paid to prior month) ÷ (cumulative pre-
development, capital & operating costs). The oil royalty regime is a bit more complicated 
because it has multiple tiers. The oil royalty is defined by the Generic Offshore Oil Royalty 
Regime of Newfoundland and Labrador, which was promulgated on November 1, 2017.  It 
consists of a basic royalty and a net royalty as in the following formulas:   
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦
= (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠)
× 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 = (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 
+  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 –  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠  
–  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 & 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) 𝑥 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Here, the basic royalty rate and the net royalty rate are determined based on the R factors.  
The royalty created by this regulation can be in a range from minimum 10% to maximum 
50% depending on the recovery factor. Also, this royalty regime is supplemented by a 
specific royalty agreement for each offshore project that allows negotiations between 
project operators and the province regarding royalties, employment, and industrial benefits.  
 
The industrial activities of the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador have 
generated significant benefits to the GDP of Newfoundland and Labrador (Table 9). With 
the slumping oil prices since the late 2014, however, the industry’s contribution to the GDP 
has significantly fallen compared to before 2015. The contribution of the oil and gas 
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industry to the provincial GDP in 2014 was $8.1 billion, down to $4.7 billion in 2015 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2016, 2017).  
 
Table 9. The Oil and Gas Industry's Contribution to the GDP in Newfoundland and 
Labrador 



























34.6% 39.6% 27.5% 30.4% 32.7% 28.2% 28.4% 25.7% 16.7% 15.1% 15.6% 
Source. Data from (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) 
 
The downturn of the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador, starting in 2015, 
brought a financial crisis to the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador. The 
oil royalties in Newfoundland and Labrador are a significant revenue source for the 
provincial government (Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2018). As the 
industrial activity in the oil and gas industry had declined, oil royalties paid to the 
government had also declined significantly, leading to a major reduction in government 
revenues (see table 10). Oil royalties paid to the provincial government in 2015 were only 
about 32% of the oil royalties paid to the provincial government in 2014 (Auditor General 
of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2015, 2016a). Due to decreased oil royalties, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s fiscal deficit in 2019 was $15.4 billion (see Table 11). The 
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fiscal deficit mostly affects the seniors and low-income people, as the deficit means less 
home care, dental coverage and other services (Bailey, 2017). 
 
Table 10. Oil and Gas Royalties and the Newfoundland and Labrador Government’s 
Revenue  
(Years ended 31 March) 


















































Oil / Total 25.9% 29.1% 29.5% 32.2% 24.4% 28.4% 22.6% 8.6% 13.7% 13.0% 13.8% 
Source. Data from Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador (2011a, 2011b, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2018) 
 
Table 11. Net Debt of the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador 
(Years ended 31 March) 

























Source. Data from (Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016b, 2016a, 2017, 2018, 2019) 
 
 
The provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the federal government 
agreed on a renewed Atlantic Accord in 2019 that will bring new revenue streams to the 
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province from their oil and gas resources. Based on this agreement, the province will 
receive revenue from the Hibernia Dividend Backed Annuity and a $3.3 billion guaranteed 
cash from the Federal Government by 2056 with $1.9 billion of cash installments by 2030, 
and will make eight annual payments of $100 million to the provincial government of NL 
since 2045 (see table 12) (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019a). A total of 
$2.5 billion will be provided to the provincial government of NL without restrictions on 
the use of funds until 2056 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019a).  
 
 
Table 12. Benefits and Payments of the Provincial Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador under Atlantic Accord Amended in 2019 
 Amount to  Amount to 
Year Receive ($) Pay ($) Year Receive ($) Pay ($) 
2019 134,860,000 - 2039 63,575,000 - 
2020 109,888,000 - 2040 63,099,000 - 
2021 111,704,000 - 2041 57,974,000 - 
2022 100,960,000 - 2042 58,816,000 - 
2023 156,850,000 - 2043 39,922,286 - 
2024 196,860,000 - 2044 39,922,286 - 
2025 232,872,000 - 2045 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2026 218,414,000 - 2046 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2027 188,701,000 - 2047 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2028 182,812,000 - 2048 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2029 154,739,000 - 2049 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2030 127,745,000 - 2050 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2031 118,592,000 - 2051 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2032 107,776,000 - 2052 39,922,286 100,000,000 
2033 93,471,000 - 2053 39,922,286 - 
2034 95,806,000 - 2054 39,922,286 - 
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2035 88,909,000 - 2055 39,922,286 - 
2036 78,244,000 - 2056 39,922,286 - 
2037 77,404,000 - Total 3,301,239,000 800,000,000 
2038 72,276,000 - Net benefit 2,504,239,000 
Sources. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (2019b) 
 
Thanks to the new revenue stream, the net debt of Newfoundland and Labrador was 
expected to decrease to $13.95 billion in 2020 (Auditor General of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2019, p. 12), however, the province still has the second-highest debt-to-GDP 
ratio after the Ontario government  in 2019 (Muthukumaran, 2019). The hopes for debt 
reduction were dashed in March 2020 when the economic downturn due to the COVID-19 
pandemic started, as the province of Newfoundland and Labrador’s revenues have 
decreased and its expenses have increased (Cowan, 2020). The pandemic shut down the 
West White Rose construction project, and about 52% of the local businesses related to oil 
and gas supply and service have laid off a part or all of their staff (Mercer, 2020). 
 
 
The Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador has warned consistently in the 
Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly about the volatility and the finite nature 
of the oil royalties which have been a significant revenue source for the Newfoundland and 
Labrador government. On the audit of the financial statement for the year ending 31 March 
2010, the Auditor General noted that: 
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“Much of the Province’s fiscal performance relates to offshore oil royalties which 
are volatile by their nature and depend on fluctuations in three main factors: world 
oil prices, production, and foreign currency fluctuations - none of which can be 
directly impacted by the Government. Furthermore, oil is a non-renewable resource 
and offshore royalties will not always be available to fund Government programs”. 
(Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2011, p. 1). 
Subsequent annual reports on the audit of the financial statement also reported volatility in 
oil royalties as a financial risk for the province and reiterated the need for medium/long-
term planning to lower the government’s dependence on oil royalties. (Auditor General of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2018). The 
government’s dependency on oil royalties has posed different challenges to budget 
development by the government. For instance, the province’s economic forecast in 2016 
was based on an assumption of steadily increasing oil prices up to 2022-2023; however, 
the price of Brent crude oil in 2019, a benchmark for Newfoundland and Labrador’s crude 
oil, averaged US $63.37/barrel in September 2019, down 16.5% from an average of 
US$71.19/barrel in 2018, and it is forecasted to be lower again due to the rise of global oil 
inventories (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019b). In addition, in 2018, there 
was an oil spill accident at Husky Energy's Sea Rose floating production storage and 
offloading vessel that caused the temporary shutdown of all offshore production facilities, 
which affected the oil royalty income (Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
2018). Also, the annual average price of Brent crude oil in 2020 is expected to be 
$34.14/barrel and $47.81/barrel in 2021 due to decreased economic activities from the 
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effect of the COVID-19 pandemic (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020b), 
which has already brought a deep crisis to NL (Mercer, 2020). 
 
In addition to the risk from the volatility of oil royalties, some studies are pointing out that 
the tax system in Newfoundland and Labrador does not bring in enough share of revenues 
from oil and gas exploitation. Bazel and Mintz (2019) evaluated the level of the resource 
rent of the provincial governments in Canada and some of the states in the United States. 
In this study, resource rent is defined as “the excess of revenues over the opportunity costs 
of using labour, capital, and other inputs in production” (Bazel & Mintz, 2019). The authors 
measured the level of rent as the Marginal Effective Tax and Royalty Rate (METRR) on 
conventional oil and gas investments at the time of investment. The METRR is estimated 
by summing up the corporate income taxes, sales taxes on capital purchases, capital taxes, 
transfer taxes, stamp duties, profit-based resource levies, and royalties on the new oil and 
gas investment (Bazel & Mintz, 2019). And the METRR shows that the oil and gas 
companies operating in Newfoundland and Labrador will share below average resource 
rents with the government for their investment (see table 13). Crisan and Mintz (2017) 
stated that the oil and gas companies in Newfoundland and Labrador have a lower tax 
burden than other provinces in Canada because of the generous allowances for exploration 
and development under the rent-based royalty systems. This raise concerns about whether 




Table 13. The METRRs on Conventional Oil and Gas Investments in Selected 








Oil 22.7% 7.4% 23.9% 23.0% 35.9% 28.6% 32.9% 
Natural Gas 27.0% 7.4% 31.9% 25.3% 36.6% 28.5% - 
Notes. NL: Newfoundland and Labrador, BC: British Columbia, AB: Alberta, SK: 
Saskatchewan 




6.2.2 The Oil and Gas Industry and Produced Capital 
Newfoundland and Labrador is the 3rd largest crude oil producer in Canada, after Alberta 
and Saskatchewan (Government of Canada, 2019). In 2017, the total oil production in 
Newfoundland and Labrador, which is all offshore, was 80,574,064 barrels. The annual oil 
production decreased until 2015 after it peaked in 2007 (see Figure 7), but has increased 
since 2016 mainly because of the high production at the Hibernia oil platform (Government 
of Canada, 2019). Oil production in 2018 was estimated to have increased to 84.0 million 
barrels due to the increased production at the Hebron platform (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019c). The Hibernia field’s life is projected to finish by 
2041 (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, 2010, p. 34). The 
total natural gas production in Newfoundland and Labrador was 523 million cubic feet per 
day (MMcf/d) in 2017. However, all-natural gas produced in Newfoundland and Labrador 
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was consumed at the offshore facilities, was reinjected into the ground to maintain reservoir 
pressure, or was flared (Government of Canada, 2019).  
 
 
Figure 7. Crude Oil Production in Newfoundland and Labrador 
Source. Data from Newfoundland & Labrador Statistics Agency (2018) 
 
According to the Canadian Energy Research Institute’s (CERI) forecasting, total crude oil 
production in Newfoundland and Labrador will increase until 2020, mainly because of the 
increasing production at the Hebron field, and then will decline again steadily (CERI, 2019). 
The Bay Du Nord development project, located 450 km offshore, east-northeast of St. 




































in 2025, however, the production amount will decline steadily after 2026 unless other oil 
fields are on-stream (CERI, 2019).  
 
In 2016, the Resource Management Department of the Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) estimated the oil reserves of 
Newfoundland and Labrador to be at 1,644 Million barrels (MMbbls) at the Hibernia field, 
506 MMbbls at the Terra Nova filed, 404 MMbbls at the White Rose field, 75 MMbbls at 
the North Amethyst field, and 707 MMbbls at the Hebron field, for a total of 3,336 MMbbls 
(C-NLOPB, 2016). However, the Oil and Gas Resource Assessment conducted by the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Nalcor Energy-Oil and Gas, and Beicip-
Franlab identified 11.7 Billion barrels (BBbls)  of oil and 60.2 trillion cubic feet of gas 
potential in offshore Newfoundland in 2018, and identified an additional 3 BBbls of oil and 
5.8 trillion cubic feet of gas potential in offshore Newfoundland in 2019 (Nalcor Energy, 
2018; World Oil, 2019). This resource assessment has provided the early stage information 
for the decision to open the future oil and gas development projects planned in “the Way 
Forward” plan. 
 
6.2.3 The Oil and Gas Industry and Natural Capital 
 
As in other jurisdictions, the ocean environment is one of the major concerns associated 
with the development of oil and gas resources in Newfoundland and Labrador. The oil and 
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gas operations impact on ecosystems by modifying biodiversity, biomass, and productivity 
(Cordes et al., 2016). The oil and gas reserves in Newfoundland and Labrador are located 
mostly on the Grand Banks, which is home to seabird colonies, marine mammals, and fish 
stocks valued at $1.4 billion in 2016 (Higgins, 2018; G. Mercer, 2019). Therefore, 
professionals in the environment and the public have expressed their fears that the offshore 
industrial activities of the oil and gas industry will deteriorate the health of the marine 
ecosystem (Higgins, 2018).  
 
Newfoundland and Labrador already has experienced several environmental disasters 
caused by oil and gas activities. One of the biggest catastrophic accidents ever to affect the 
marine ecosystem in Newfoundland and Labrador was the oil spill from Husky’s SeaRose 
floating production storage and offloading vessel at the White Rose field on November 16, 
2018 (Mckenzie-Sutter, 2018). The accident caused a total of 250,000 litres of crude oil to 
be spilled into the ocean, and it was the largest oil spill accident that happened on the coast 
of Newfoundland and Labrador ("CBC News", 2018). The White Rose field encompasses 
the areas with high-density marine life off the edges of the Grand Banks and also fish 
spawning areas (Canadian Science Advisory Secretariat, 2013). Biologists estimated that 
about 100,000 seabirds were killed or poisoned and there will be a serious long-term effect 
due to low reproduction rates, although the damage is difficult to calculate accurately 
(Oiledwildlife.eu, 2018). After only about 8 months, there was another oil spill at the 
Hibernia oil platform off the coast of St. John's on July 17, 2019. It is estimated that about 
12,000 litres of crude oil spilled into the ocean, and the oil production was temporarily shut 
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down (“The Canadian Press,” 2019). The platform re-started its operation on August 16, 
2019, and shortly after that, there was a second oil spill of about 2,184 litres on August 17, 
2019 (McKenzie-Sutter, 2019). These oil spills deteriorate commercial fisheries not only 
because they damage the fish in their egg, larval, and juvenile stages but also because they 
hurt the value of fish products on the market (Higgins, 2018). 
 
Besides oil spills, there are several other environmental concerns raised by the public, 
scientists, and fishers with regard to the oil and gas exploration and exploitation in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. The first issue is the effects of seismic testing from the oil 
and gas industry on the marine environment. The Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union 
(FFAW) asserted that the seismic testing would interfere with the snow crab fishery when 
the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) approved the 
offshore seismic testing on the Grand Banks in 2017 (Dhillon, 2017a). 
 
Also, in the public discussions on the future of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Inshore 
Fishery, the fishers have questioned the effects of seismic testing on the marine 
environment (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2019). In fact, the possibility of harmful effects 
from seismic testing on the marine environment has been raised for some time (Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada, 2007). In the National Advisory Process meeting on the Seismic 
Impact Evaluation Framework in May 2004, Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2004) 
discussed the uncertainty of the effects of seismic sounds on the marine environment and 
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concluded that there was a need for studies to fill in knowledge gaps with regard to marine 
mammals’ reaction to seismic sound. With regard to these concerns, there has been little 
agreement on the significant level of seismic sounds’ effects on the marine environment. 
An Environmental Assessment (EA) of the Compagnie Générale de Géophysique Services 
Canada Inc.’s marine seismic program in the Newfoundland offshore area within the 2016-
2025 timeframe has stated  that “It is predicted that the seismic surveys will not cause any 
mortality to the valued marine species, thus there will be negligible cumulative mortality 
effect.” (LGL Limited Environmental Research Associates, 2016, p. 178). On the other 
hand, Lindy Weilgart, adjunct Research Associate in the Department of Biology, Dalhousie 
University, asserted that seismic air guns used for oil and gas exploration have wiped out 
planktons, which is not only the primary producers of biomass in the oceans, but absorbers 
of the province’s greenhouse gases as well  (“CBC News,” 2019). This assertion was also 
supported by Mccauley et al. (2017), which presented a significant potential impact on the 
ocean ecosystem function from seismic technology. This study found out that the air gun 
used for seismic surveys causes a two-to threefold increase in the mortality of adult and 
larval zooplankton.  
 
Another environmental issue related to the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and 
Labrador is greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Ever since the first full year of production 
of the oil and gas industry in 1998, the offshore Newfoundland and Labrador area has been 
the main source of GHG emissions in Newfoundland and Labrador. The industrial activities 
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of the oil and gas industry emitted the equivalent of 2,858 kilotonnes of carbon dioxide, 
accounting for 27.1% of the total provincial GHG emissions in 2017 (see table 14).  
 
Table 14. Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Air in Newfoundland and Labrador 1998 - 
2017 (unit: kilotonnes) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 42,211 42,962 42,515 43,867 42,984 44,323 44,646 43,951 44,496 46,239 
Oil and Gas  3,195 2,628 1,847 1,744 3,387 2,961 2,735 2,640 2,975 3,122 
O&G/Total 31.2% 28.2% 20.8% 18.3% 29.6% 26.6% 25.9% 26.8% 31.2% 29.3% 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total 45,382 43,891 46,229 45,512 45,022 44,947 44,890 45,304 44,462 43,760 
Oil and Gas 2,651 2,721 2,628 2,362 2,398 2,594 2,712 2,668 2,940 2,858 
O&G/Total 26.6% 28.1% 27.0% 24.0% 25.5% 27.5% 26.0% 25.0% 27.1% 27.1% 
Source. Data from Environment and Climate Change Canada (2019)   
 
However, the climate policy commitments of Newfoundland and Labrador had been 
modest, despite the large contribution of the oil and gas industry to GHG emissions 
(Mertins-Kirkwood, 2017). The Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project has been a big part of 
the Newfoundland and Labrador’s climate policy efforts, however, it has faced significant 
cost escalation and lengthy delays (Mertins-Kirkwood, 2017). The province announced a 
new carbon tax plan on October 23, 2018, which came into effect on January 1, 2019. Under 
the carbon tax system, oil and gas production facilities have had to reduce their carbon 
emissions to 6% below their 2016 to 2017 historical average emissions-to-output ratio for 
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2019, and gradually reduce an additional 2% every year until they reach a target of 12% 
below 2016 levels (Executive Council, 2018). If they fail to meet the targets, they are 
required to either pay the money into an emissions reduction fund or buy credits (“CBC 
News,” 2018b). Climate Watch NL (2018), however, commented that the carbon tax favors 
the oil and gas industry, especially due to the several exemptions of the oil and gas 
industry’s activities. Fuels used for offshore exploration activities and methane GHGs in 
the oil and gas industry will be exempted under the regulation (Executive Council, 2018). 
Furthermore, oil and gas companies will double their production under the “Way forward” 
plan, which can possibly add significant carbon emissions. Regarding this point, Tom 
Cooper, an associate professor at MUN's faculty of business administration said that "I am 
not sure the current carbon tax really reflects the true cost of pollution on the environment" 
(“CBC News,” 2018b).  
 
6.2.4 The Oil and Gas Industry and Human Capital 
 
In 2017, direct employment resulting from the oil and gas companies was 5,359 persons, 
and the total employment, which includes indirect employment resulting from companies 
providing goods and services to the oil and gas companies, was 19,200 persons (see table 
15). Considering the total employment in Newfoundland and Labrador, the total 
employment resulting from oil and gas activities accounted for 8.6% of the total 
employment in Newfoundland and Labrador. The employment peaked at 33,000 persons 
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in 2014 which accounted for 13.8% of the total employment in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Based on these numbers, the oil and gas companies are important sources of 
employment in Newfoundland and Labrador. Considering that the share of GDP generated 
by the oil and gas industry in 2014 was 25.7% in 2014 and 15.6% in 2017, however, the 





Table 15. Employment Impact of the Oil and Gas Industry in Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
(Unit: persons) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Direct 
employment 
of O&G  









201,900 198,800 174,300 206,500 210,700 213,200 212,300 214,400 217,000 221,100 
Direct 
employment 
/Total in NL 
0.97% 1.34% 1.30% 1.03% 1.55% 1.82% 1.58% 1.37% 1.22% 1.35% 
Indirect 
employment 
/Total in NL 
2.03% 3.12% 2.81% 1.69% 2.80% 3.42% 5.93% 7.28% 4.88% 5.83% 












215,100 222,800 231,900 240,800 242,700 238,600 236,200 232,600 224,100  
Direct 
employment 
/Total in NL 
1.50% 1.43% 1.66% 2.15% 3.22% 4.26% 3.78% 3.05% 2.39%  
Indirect 
employment 
/Total in NL 










Sources. Data from Stantec Consulting Ltd (2009, 2012, 2014, 2019) and Government of 




The oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador has also made contributions to the 
infrastructure for human capital development in Newfoundland and Labrador. For example, 
the Hibernia Management and Development Company Ltd. (HMDC) donated $4.4 million 
to the Hibernia Offshore Operations Simulator Facility at Memorial University’s Marine 
Institute in 2014 and $16 million for a new helicopter training and R&D centre in 2015 
(Osborne, 2014; Stantec Consulting Ltd, 2019). The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board spent approximately $43 million for research &  development, 
education, and training in 2017 (C-NLOPB, 2018). The oil and gas industry also provides 
co-op opportunities for approximately 340 students at Memorial University of 
Newfoundland (MUN) every year (Stantec Consulting Ltd, 2019).  
 
However, several concerns have been raised about the labor force concerning the oil and 
gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador. The reports from Stantec Consulting pointed 
out several distribution issues of the oil income and benefits for employees. In their reports 
on the socio-economic benefits of the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
they stated that “much of the income earned in Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore oil 
and gas industry accrues to non-resident companies” (Stantec Consulting Ltd, 2012, 2019). 
Because of this, the impact on personal income growth generated by the oil and gas industry 
is less significant than that of the provincial GDP growth (Stantec Consulting Ltd, 2012, 
2019). The Conference Board of Canada has assessed that human capital in Newfoundland 
and Labrador needs to be improved the most, compared to other provinces in Canada 
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because of the low labour productivity, unemployment rate, and aging of the population in 
the province for sustainability (the Conference Board of Canada, 2017). In another report, 
it is also claimed that Newfoundland and Labrador needs to increase education levels for 
development of the human capital for sustainable economic prosperity for future 
generations (Palladini, 2015). The report concluded by emphasizing the need to diversify 
the growth engine of Newfoundland and Labrador, as the oil and gas industry is not 
sustainable (Palladini, 2015). Palladini (2015) also proposed to create a SWF which will 
help the province to rely less on oil prices and more on the interest generated by the SWF, 
to attract new businesses, and to ensure that the future generations also benefit from the oil 
wealth. The Common Front Newfoundland and Labrador, the community coalition of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, also suggested investing in human capital to build a 
sustainable economy (Common Front NL, 2016). They found out that approximately 
10,000 Newfoundlanders used to work in the Alberta oil patch but lived in rural areas of 
Newfoundland and Labrador and came back to Newfoundland and Labrador with the 
economic downturn (Common Front NL, 2016). Residents living in remote communities 
in Newfoundland and Labrador are more closely related to the oil and gas industry than 
residents in urban areas, and the employment opportunities from oil and gas industries are 
crucial to the young workers living in small rural regions where job opportunities are 
limited, therefore, their employment chances are more dependent on oil and gas industry 
(Canadian Rural Revitalization Foundation, 2015). In 2016, Common Front NL 
recommended that the province provide job training and education for the transition of the 
workforce from the oil and gas industry and establish policies to support a diversified 
economy (Common Front NL, 2016). Mertins-Kirkwood (2017) also asserted that 
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Newfoundland and Labrador needs to support the transition of oil workers in 
Newfoundland and Labrador since the province has one of the highest concentrations of 
fossil fuel workers. The study pointed out the lack of transition planning from the fossil 
fuel economy, while job growth in clean technologies, energy efficiency, and in other low 
carbon industries is a key opportunity (Mertins-Kirkwood, 2017).  
 
6.2.5 The Oil and Gas Industry and Social Capital 
 
The fishing communities in Newfoundland and Labrador have expressed their 
disappointment and the sense of deprivation from the sprawling oil field and industry. In 
the public discussions on the future of the province’s inshore fishery with Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada (DFO) and fishers in November 2017, the fishers brought up the 
contradictory nature of oil development policies that allowed drilling for oil and gas 
development in the areas which prohibited fishing activities for the protection of corals and 
sponges (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2019). For example, in July 2017, The Fish, Food 
and Allied Workers Union (FFAW), the province’s largest fishers’ union, issued a press 
release asserting that seismic testing on the Grand Banks must stop until after the fishery is 
done because the seismic blasting interferes with the crab fishery (Dhillon, 2017b). This 
was only three months after the DFO slashed the crab quota by 22% in April 2017. In 
January 2019, the Federation of Independent Sea Harvesters of Newfoundland and 
Labrador (FISH-NL) also demanded that an end be put to seismic testing off Newfoundland 
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and Labrador's coasts and expressed their concerns on the relationship between plunging 
plankton productivity off Newfoundland and Labrador's coasts and seismic activity (The 
Telegram, 2019). In September 2019, Newfoundland and Labrador's fishers’ union, Fish, 
Food and Allied Workers (FFAW), asserted that oil and gas companies shouldn't be 
allowed to explore in crab fishing areas and the oil and gas exploration on the fishing 
grounds needed to be stopped (Cowan, 2019).  
 
The oil fields off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador are owned by different groups 
of Canadian and international companies. Although it is hard to find data about how much 
of the benefits generated from the oil and gas resources of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s province are transferred outside of Newfoundland and Labrador, it can be 
assumed that the benefits from natural resources in Newfoundland and Labrador can be 
leaked out of the province through the ownership structure of the oil fields in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. The Hibernia oil field is operated by Hibernia Management 
and Development Company Ltd, and the interest owners are ExxonMobil (33.125%), 
Chevron (26.875%), Suncor Energy (20%), Canada Hibernia Holding Corporation (8.5%), 
Murphy Oil (6.5%) and Equinor (5%) (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 
2017). The Terra Nova oil field is operated by Suncor Energy, and the interest owners are 
Suncor Energy (37.675%), ExxonMobil (19%), Equinor (15%), Husky Energy (13%), 
Murphy Oil (10.475%), Mosbacher Operating (3.85%), Chevron (1%) (Suncor Energy, 
2020). The White Rose oil filed is operated by Husky Energy, and the interest owners are 
Husky Energy (72.5%) and Suncor (27.5%) (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 
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2017). The Hebron oil field is operated by ExxonMobil, and the interest owners are 
ExxonMobil (35.5%), Chevron (29.6%), Suncor Energy (21%), Equinor (9%), Nalcor 
Energy (4.9%) (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2017). Among these 
companies, the companies based in Newfoundland and Labrador are Hibernia Management 
and Development Company and Nalcor Energy in St. Johns while the other companies have 
their headquarters outside of Canada, in countries such as the US (ExxonMobil, Chevron, 
Murphy Oil), Norway (Equinor), or in other provinces such as Alberta in Canada (Husky 
Energy, Mosbacher Operating, Suncor Energy). Therefore, the reform of the ownership and 
royalty structure in the NL oil and gas industry is stringently needed. Considering that 
Norway established a state-controlled joint-stock company “Statoil” to have control over 
their oil and gas revenue, a similar reform will allow more wealth to be owned by the 
Newfoundland and Labrador residents who are the owners of the property rights to 
resources in their subsoil and subsea areas. 
 
To sum up, the current arrangements for the oil and gas industrial processes in NL take 
away the fraction of benefits that should have been enjoyed by the NL people and other 
local industry players. One cause of this is that the activities of other industries (e.g. 
fisheries) can be hindered and crowded out by the activities of oil and gas industry, and the 
oil and gas companies take more benefits from natural resources than other industries that 
also have the property rights to the natural resources of the ocean. The second reason is that 
too many foreign oil and gas companies are involved in the development of resources in 
Newfoundland and Labrador and they are benefiting unjustly from the resources of 
127 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador to the detriment of the provincial residents. Norway and 
Alaska have created and used the SWF mechanisms to collect more royalties and taxes 
from oil and gas companies, and have invested the funds to benefit the domestic economy. 
These are good examples for reforming the Newfoundland and Labrador’s oil and gas 
industry operation. 
 
6.3. Discussion on the Potential of a SWF for Newfoundland and Labrador 
6.3.1. Lessons from the Norwegian and Alaskan Experiences 
This section discusses how a SWF should be created and used to ensure the sustainable 
development of Newfoundland and Labrador’s province. The discussion is based on the 
foundation of the results of the analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The capital approach 
to sustainability assumes that financial capital is a liquid asset with the potential to be 
invested in the process of capital conversion (Goodwin, 2003; Maack & Davidsdottir, 
2015). From this point of view, the main function of an oil fund should be to boost the 
sustainability of Newfoundland and Labrador through investment in produced capital, 
natural capital, human capital, and social capital. As the main source of the fund’s earnings 
is the oil revenue, the “resource curse” theory and the environmental justice theory are 
worthy of consideration here, since they provide the theoretical frameworks explaining why 
economic growth driven by the non-renewable resource revenue is not sustainable.  
 
1) The “Resource Curse” and the SWFs 
128 
 
The lessons from the debates on the “resource curse” phenomenon explain why the 
resource-abundant countries fall into the trap of the “resource curse” and how to avoid it. 
Firstly, generating natural resource wealth can have a weak linkage with the production 
activities of the other domestic industries when they operate by joint enterprises with non-
domestic companies (Heinrich, 2011; Humphreys et al., 2007). Norway has been skeptical 
toward foreign capital and tried to bring the benefits from resource development to its 
society. Alaska had gone through several experiences of exploitation from non-domestic 
interests for Alaska’s fur, fisheries, and mineral resources and hence they have been aware 
of their property rights for the resources. The Norwegian SWF and the Alaskan SWF have 
delivered more benefits to society than a hypothetical scenario without the SWFs. The 
income has been saved or reinvested for the current and future generations. The cases of 
Norway and Alaska show that a well-managed SWF prioritizing the interests of the local 
residents over the interests of foreign companies can be a good instrument to avoid the 
“resource curse”, to prevent the leakage of domestic wealth and to promote the 
sustainability of the entire society.  
 
The volatility of resource revenue from fossil fuels is another potential reason for the 
“resource curse”. Saving the resource revenues can be an effective way to avoid the 
“resource curse”, as it provides “bureaucracy time to plan and invest effectively in 
infrastructures as well as financial resources” (Bauer, 2013, p. 9). While both aim to avoid 
the “resource curse” and to maintain the long-term sustainability of the domestic society, 
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) and the Alaska Permanent Fund 
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(APF) have different strategies in terms of the savings amount for future generations. The 
GPFG has focused more to establish solid savings for Norway’s future generations, while 
the APF has contributed more to provide income to the current generations in Alaska. As a 
result, Norway has a solid fund size which is large enough to offset the impact of volatility 
in the global oil market. Alaska's APF is more dependent on the annual oil income, 
compared to the GPFG, but that can be offset by adjusting the amount of the dividend. For 
example, the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) in 2016 was about 50% of the PFD in 2015 
due to the plunged oil income. Thus, Norway’s SWF framework is financially more 
sustainable than Alaska’s SWF framework. On the other hand, Alaska’s SWF framework 
has the advantage of contributing to the economic revitalization of the current generation, 
because it increases the disposable income of the current generation. For example, the APF 
contributes to lessening poverty in Alaska, especially for rural, Native, and senior Alaskans 
(Berman & Reamey, 2016). Also, as Kurland (2017) and Feinberg and Kuehn (2019) 
claimed, the amount of the dividend (PFD) has had positive impacts on small business entry 
in Alaska. Therefore, it seems that Alaska’s SWF has the capability to increase the human 
capital and the produced capital for Alaska’s future sustainability. 
 
Another potential cause of  the “resource curse” is the discrepancy between the property 
rights to the natural resources, which belong to the public, and the right to sell the mined 
resources, which is generally acquired by the oil and gas companies (Wenar, 2008). This 
discrepancy brings inefficiency in building the wealth of the society because the oil and gas 
companies which were given access to the resources in exchange for royalties and taxes 
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collected by the government do not invest enough locally to increase the wealth of the 
people who should be the main beneficiaries of the resource wealth (Wenar, 2008). 
Therefore, the government should take the share that arguably belongs to the public from 
the companies and return it to the public. The GPFG and the APF government are one of 
the ways the government of Norway and Alaska return the benefits to the public. Lack of 
public participation in decision-making processes concerning oil and gas resources also 
restricts the chance to promote the domestic economy (Humphreys et al., 2007). The GPFG 
and the APF reallocate the resource revenue collected from those with the right to sell the 
resources to those with the property rights to own the natural resources. Also, Norway and 
Alaska have made publicly available information related to the earnings and use of their 
SWFs to the public, to ensure transparency of the fund’s management. Thus, the people 
living in Norway or Alaska are guaranteed more rights as people with the property rights 
to the resources in comparison to a hypothetical scenario where the SWFs did not exist. 
 
Based on these differences, what needs to be decided first is how to take more control over 
the oil and gas resources in Newfoundland and Labrador from foreign companies. From 
the case of Norway, a government owned or managed company that has control over the 
oil and gas resource in the country could help. Also, how to distribute the wealth between 
current and future generations if NL were to create a new oil fund needs to be determined. 
In other words, how much should oil companies be taxed or pay in royalties, how much of 
this government revenue should be saved in order to build the fund, and how much fund 
income should be used and invested for the current generations and how much should be 
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left for future generations? The criteria for answering these questions is the long-term 
sustainability of society. In order to create a long-term sustainable society, it is important 
to sustain all capitals that are the sources of the wealth, and they can be sustained by using 
the income (interest) from a sustainable oil fund. This is because, according to the theory 
of “weak” sustainability, the fund will eventually provide the financial capital to be 
converted to other forms of capital. 
 
2) Environmental Justice and the SWFs 
Non-renewable resources exploitation come with environmental degradation. Every stage 
of the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources can deteriorate the environment, 
especially by causing climate change and polluting the marine environments. In the case 
studies, the issues of the environmental damages caused by oil and gas development are 
related to the issues of environmental justice in several ways. In keeping with  Kuehn's  
(2000) categorization of environmental justice issues, the environmental justice issues 
related to oil and gas operations can be categorized as follows: distributive justice, 
procedural justice, corrective justice, and social justice. Norway, Alaska, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador have all suffered from environmental degradation resulted 
from the oil and gas exploration and exploitation. Examples of environmental degradation 
are changes in and decline of fishery resources caused by oil spill accidents, exploration 
and production activities of oil and gas companies in the ocean, and climate change caused 
by greenhouse gas emissions from oil production activities and fossil fuel combustion. Also, 
as an oil exporting province, Newfoundland and Labrador has raised other (oil importing) 
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countries’ SCC (social cost of carbon), like the cases of Alaska and Norway show. These 
environmental damages negatively affect the wealth of the society; however, oil and gas 
companies do not pay the proper cost of exploitation when there are no well-designed 
policy instruments to make them pay the whole cost. Therefore, the burden of damages 
from resource exploration and exploitation is borne by everyone else, including the public 
locally and outside of Canada, while the benefits are mostly taken by oil and gas companies. 
This discrepancy between the burdens and the benefits can be related to the case of 
environmental distributive injustice caused by oil and gas developments. Meanwhile, the 
fishers in Newfoundland and Labrador not only have suffered from the deteriorating marine 
environment of their fishing grounds but also have been disappointed about the 
government’s decisions to expand oil fields in areas where their fishing activities have been 
limited due to environmental concerns (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2019) This issue 
seems to show that the fishers in Newfoundland and Labrador had experienced 
environmental procedural injustices related to the oil and gas exploitations.   
 
These environmental injustices explain why the oil and gas companies should pay more for 
access to the resources and invest more of their revenues for the sake of public welfare. The 
redistribution of the oil and gas revenue through SWFs can alleviate the distributive 
injustice arising from the oil and gas developments with policy and laws that allocate a 
larger share of the benefits of natural resources to the people (Olawuyi & Onifade, 2018). 
In the same way that Norway did, Newfoundland and Labrador also can consider investing 
the rents earned from the oil and gas industry in new sustainable energy infrastructure 
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which can compensate for the environmental degradation from oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation, as a way to recover environmental justice. For example, Newfoundland and 
Labrador can reduce the carbon emissions footprint in the province by investing in a clean 
energy system based on wind (Mercer et al., 2017) for remote communities that are 
currently utilizing diesel power systems. These are the areas that need more studies in the 
future, yet, ultimately, Newfoundland and Labrador needs to diversify its industries to make 




6.3.2. How Big Should the Fund Be to Follow the Norwegian/Alaskan SWF Models? 
 
This section roughly estimates the size of the oil fund needed to be adopted as a sustainable 
SWF framework for Newfoundland and Labrador. The estimation starts from the following 
two assumptions: first, the oil and gas industry will continue in Newfoundland and 
Labrador once the current downturn, due to the COVID-19 outbreak and to the oil price 
slump, is over; second, there is political will at the level of the federal and provincial 
governments for reforming the oil and gas industry in the province, to set it on a sustainable 
path. The Norwegian SWF model will bring sustainable annual returns even after the 
depletion of the oil resources in the future, while the Alaskan SWF model currently brings 
higher oil revenue shares to the public. In order to estimate the oil royalties rate required to 
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follow the Norwegian or Alaskan SWF model, the current oil royalty rate of a 
Newfoundland and Labrador oil fund needs to be identified; however, it is difficult to 
estimate the current tax rates on oil and gas production in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
The first reason is that the current royalty regime for oil and gas resources in Newfoundland 
and Labrador is being applied differently across the project fields. The second reason is 
that the consolidated results of the operations of the government reporting entity which 
include the data on the amount of oil revenue are reported for the period from the first day 
of March to the last date of February every year, while the industrial production data of the 
oil and gas industry is reported for the period from the first day of January to the last day 
of December every year. Thus, it is impossible to calculate the annual oil royalties levied 
on the oil and gas exploitation in Newfoundland and Labrador.  
 
Alternatively, this section estimates the size of the fund required to keep it sustainable even 
after the oil and gas revenue will have dropped significantly, while also allowing the 
government to spend enough for the current generation. It is assumed that the annual rate 
of return of the new fund for Newfoundland and Labrador is equal to the investment of the 
province of Newfoundland and Labrador in the Pooled Pension Fund (NLPPF)’s annual 
rate of return as a close reference. The annual rate of return of the NLPPF in recent years, 
however, has been fluctuating due to global market volatility (Office of the Auditor General, 
2018). For example, the annual rate of return of the NLPPF in 2018 was -1.4% while it was 
12.9% in 2017. For this reason, it is assumed that Newfoundland and Labrador can yield a 
7.1%  annual rate of return, which is the average rate of return over the past 20 years of the 
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NLPPF (Office of the Auditor General, 2018, p. 7). The annual fund spending required for 
the provincial government is assumed based on the previous oil royalties that have been 
paid. As this amount is based on the previous annual spending, without considering the 
potential use of the fund for future sustainability, the resulting amount of the fund is the 
minimum requirement, not the recommended amount. Compared to the early 2010s, the oil 
royalties have declined significantly, and government debt has increased accordingly 
(Table 14). The annual fund spending required for the provincial government should be at 
least large enough to not increase the provincial debt. Thus, it is assumed that the annual 
fund spending is equal to the oil revenue for the government in 2012 as it is the most recent 
year NL's debt has not increased. The oil revenue in 2012 was $2,795 million (Auditor 
General of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013, p. 20). This is equal to $3,027 million when 
the amount is converted with the GDP deflator to the real price in 2018.  
 
Taking into account the aforementioned factors, the total amount of the fund recommended 
is $42,633 million, if the Newfoundland and Labrador government can yield a 7.1% rate of 
return annually using the new oil fund and will plan to spend less than the annual returns. 
Considering the projected field life of the Hibernia field, which produces the largest amount 
of oil and gas revenue in Newfoundland and Labrador, the fund should reach this amount 
by 2041. If Newfoundland and Labrador introduces an oil fund based on the Norwegian 
SWF model from next year, the provincial government needs to deposit an average of 
$2,132 million (in 2018 prices) yearly for the next 20 years, in addition to the annual 
government revenue. According to this calculation, the province of Newfoundland and 
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Labrador can establish a sustainable amount of the fund by separately collecting the same 
amount of royalty as before the oil price crash in 2015.  
 
There are more variables and uncertainties on the result, however. First of all, a percentage 
of 7.1% spending of the fund is relatively generous, compared to the spending limits of the 
Norwegian SWF. If Newfoundland and Labrador decided to have a strict 4% spending rule, 
like Norway, in order to make the fund more sustainable, the total amount of saving has to 
be $ 75,673 million and the annual deposit has to be an average of $ 3,784 million yearly 
for the next 20 years. The province of Newfoundland and Labrador has estimated that 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore area has 2.2 BBbls of discovered oil reserves left 
to exploit and another 37.5 BBbls of undiscovered oil (Oil and Gas Industry Development 
Council, 2018). If the oil and gas can be produced for longer, as new oil wells are under 
development, the annual burden could be much lessened. How much more oil and gas will 
be produced depends on a number of variables besides the reserve amount of oil and gas. 
The actual production volume of oil and gas depends on the commercial reserve, which 
means economically meaningful reserve, not discovered reserves. The volume of 
commercial reserves is affected by oil and gas price, but also by the development of 
production technology. In addition, the discovered reserve can vary with the scope of 
exploration and technological advances. Therefore, more research is needed to determine 





6.3.3. What Are the Challenges and Considerations? 
 
Despite having enjoyed the abundance of oil resources in recent years, Newfoundland and 
Labrador is among the most financially-challenged provinces in Canada, with a highly oil-
dependent economy, a high GDP-debt ratio, a high unemployment rate, and a rapidly aging 
population. Learning from the cases of Norway and Alaska, building a SWF can help 
provide the resources to solve these problems, if the oil income and expenditure are 
managed properly. However, the first challenge for the province is to redesign their oil and 
gas royalty system, to reflect the stringent criteria of the Norwegian and Alaskan SWFs. 
Another challenge is the high costs of the oil and gas development projects. According to  
the Wood Mackenzie's (2018) study, which compared oil development costs in Brazil, the 
United States, Mexico, Norway, Australia, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Nova Scotia, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Newfoundland and Labrador is amongst the most expensive 
areas for the future oil and gas activities. When considering the summation of capital 
expenditures and operating expenditures, the cost of oil and gas development in shallow 
water is cheaper (18.6 United States Dollar [USD] / Barrel of oil equivalent [BOE] ) than 
the average of other regions (22.4 USD /BOE); however, the cost increases to about USD 
24/BOE when the Hibernia project is removed from the estimation. Also, the average cost 
of oil and gas developments in deep water, where the recent exploration activities have 
taken place, is about USD14/BOE higher than the average of the other regions (Wood 
Mackenzie, 2018, p. 30). Thus, the impact on the economic viability of projects in the oil 
industry will be greater than in other regions, due to the higher breakeven prices of the oil 
138 
 
and gas from Newfoundland and Labrador, if oil royalty rates in Newfoundland and 
Labrador are increased to help create the new SWF.  
 
Another challenge for Newfoundland and Labrador is formulating a consensus on the need 
for a SWF. The Norwegian government could have control over the oil and gas industry 
based on the public belief in a strong state power and the idea that the resources in Norway 
belong to the nation. Based on these backgrounds, the government has begun to collect a 
sizable amount of royalties in the early history of oil and gas development. Alaska also has 
a public consensus on the need to protect domestic resources from foreign investors, 
especially among Native residents. Consequently, the Alaska government started a 
discussion to create the fund when they discovered the first oil field on their ocean shelf 
and then spent 4 years to have the fund established. Newfoundland and Labrador also will 
need governmental and public consensus on the need for a SWF. The consensus includes 
answering difficult questions such as whether the SWF is needed or not in NL, what will 
be the wealth distribution formula between the future generations and the current 
generation, and where to invest the fund earnings.  
 
 





Due to the price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, which are the biggest players in the 
global oil market, and the decreasing oil demand from the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
monthly oil prices in the second quarter of 2020 were at a record low in 18 years. The U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) has forecasted that the annual average price of 
Brent crude oil will be United States Dollar (USD) 34.14/barrel in 2020 and USD 
47.81/barrel in 2021 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020b). This low oil price 
trend and the COVID-19 pandemic is bringing a deep crisis in the province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s oil and gas industry. As a consequence, drillings to discover 
new oil wells have been stopped and up to 200 workers could be laid off on the Hibernia 
field (T. Roberts, 2020). Meanwhile, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador works 
to keep on track with the “Way Forward” plan (Abraham, 2020). Planning for introduction 
of a SWF, designed with the features of the successful SWFs of Norway and Alaska in 
mind, should be the first priority of the government, as the economy rebounds from the 
current crises. 
 
Studies have shown that during crises, a SWF can help to maintain the stability of the 
domestic economy as well as guarantee a sustainable source of future income, hence, it 
brings positively impacts on economic growth (Al-sasi et al., 2017; Reiche, 2010; Sun et 
al., 2014; Tehranchian & Seyyedkolaee, 2017). The case of Norway also shows that 
creating a SWF helps to overcome macroeconomic crises, such as oil price shocks, as is 
gives capacity to absorb the shocks and balance the government budget, and it can provide 
additional funds for provincial budgets in an emergency. The current oil price trend will be 
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a burden on introducing a SWF framework in NL, considering the low oil price trend in the 
short-term, although the long-term impact is unknown. As aforementioned, the forecasted 
annual average price of Brent crude oil is USD 34.14/barrel in 2020 and USD 47.81/barrel 
in 2021 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020b). These prices are at a similar 
level to the 2015 and 2016 levels, when the oil price was USD 52.32 and USD 43.74 
respectively (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020c).  
 
Another possible option is diversification of income sources for the fund. In the case of 
Alaska, the mining industry as well as the oil and gas industry are both subject to royalties 
for the SWF. The US state of Alaska received about 26% of the total tax revenue from the 
oil and gas and 4.5% of the total tax revenue received from mining industry in 2016 
(McDowell Group, 2017). Newfoundland and Labrador also has a mining industry which 
is another basic industry in the province. Newfoundland and Labrador has been ranked 
among the top three mining jurisdictions in Canada, and the mining industry accounted for 
6.3% of the provincial GDP in 2017 (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019c). 
The mining industry, like the oil and gas industry, is an industry exploiting non-renewable 
resources, accordingly the impact on the sustainability of Newfoundland and Labrador 





This chapter has investigated how the province of NL can ensure its sustainable growth 
using their oil and gas resources, based on the case studies of Norway and Alaska. In recent 
decades, Newfoundland and Labrador's economy has been dependent on the rise and fall 
of the oil and gas industry. The province of Newfoundland and Labrador is currently owing 
the largest debt ever and has a high unemployment rate of 13.8% (as of 2018) since the low 
oil prices started in the mid-2010s. The oil and gas industry is also a major contributor to 
GHG emissions in Newfoundland and Labrador; however, the industry is levied a smaller 
carbon tax burden than they should be responsible for. In addition, companies operating the 
oil fields off the coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador are global companies with 
headquarters outside Newfoundland and Labrador. So, they need to take proper 
responsibility for consuming Newfoundland and Labrador’s natural resources.  
 
If Newfoundland and Labrador can create a SWF, it can provide a capacity to avoid the 
“resource curse” phenomenon and to solve the problem of environmental injustice which 
will bring sustainable development in Newfoundland and Labrador. On the other hand, in 
the short-term, the royalty rate rise to provide funds for establishing a  SWF can be a huge 
burden for oil and gas companies, especially given the high cost of production in the 
offshore of Newfoundland and Labrador and the recent low oil price trend. However, in the 
long run, a SWF helps economic growth in Newfoundland and Labrador, so the government 
needs to look for more funding options (such as from the mining industry). In addition, as 
more oil wells are being developed under the “Way Forward” plan, the fund will be able to 












7.1 Summary and Conclusion 
The future that Newfoundland and Labrador should prepare for is not bright when 
considering the structural changes in the economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the era of low oil prices. Newfoundland and Labrador’s economy is already in a bad 
position compared to other Canadian provinces due to its loss of young population and 
record-high debt amount. The “Way Forward” plan that has been eagerly pursued by the 
provincial government should bring quantitative growth in terms of a traditional economic 
index, such as GDP, but growth will not be sustainable, as the socio-economic state of the 
province is showing. To sustain the development based on the oil and gas industry, this 
study suggests that it is necessary to accumulate financial capital using oil and gas revenue 
and invest it to build other capitals and minimize the negative impact of the development, 
especially due to the “resource curse” and “environmental injustice” phenomena. There are 
two successful cases that convert oil wealth into more sustainable streams utilizing a 
financial vehicle called SWF and boost their sustainability, which are Norway and Alaska. 
This study examines whether Newfoundland and Labrador can also adopt a SWF like 
Norway and Alaska and grow more sustainable. At the introduction, the following research 




1) An examination of how the Norwegian SWF contributes to the sustainability of Norway: 
What impacts did the Norwegian SWF have on the sustainability of Norway? 
Norway has secured ownership for government of for the oil and gas development on the 
Norwegian shelf and created a Norwegian SWF, the GPFG, at the early stage of oil and gas 
development, based on the social values of equality and integrity. The GPFG is the largest 
SWF in the world 10,088 billion NOK (1,148 billion USD) in 2019 with its strong 
accumulation, responsible and diversified investment portfolio (Norges Bank Investment 
Management, 2019a), and restricted spending limit. Thanks to the size of the fund, Norway 
has the capacity to maintain their wealth under global economic volatility. Norway has 
ethical guidelines for responsible investment which is designed to ensure the benefits for 
the entire society. The guidelines contribute to reducing the negative impact of oil and gas 
development on the natural capital and social capital of Norway, although it still brings 
environmental injustice issues from fossil fuel utilization.  
 
The Norwegian case gives some good implications for a SWF operation using non-
renewable resource revenue. From the case of Norway, the lessons that Newfoundland and 
Labrador should take are the importance of saving part of the oil and gas revenue and the 
imperative of investing with a long-term social perspective in mind. Norway has 
established the fund with high savings and conservative spending limits. However, in 
addition to the successful size of the SWF, Norway's GPFG is also characterized by its 
long-term perspective and environmentally responsible operation. Newfoundland and 
Labrador must increase its oil royalties and tax rates in order to support a SWF, but 
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considering the high oil production costs in the province, it is hard to imagine that 
Newfoundland and Labrador will be  able to tax as high as 78% of the revenue of the oil 
and gas companies like Norway does. However, creating government savings for the future 
is beneficial for long-term sustainability and Newfoundland and Labrador need to make 
efforts to accomplish this. Also, the Norwegian SWF are also considered to be good 
examples of operating SWFs using non-renewable resources, in that Norway cares not only 
for economically sustainable returns but also for environmental and social sustainability 
through responsible investment. The fact that there is responsible investment, particularly 
in non-oil and gas sectors, has reduced the shocks caused by the oil price crash in recent 
years shows that responsible investment can bring benefits not only from an ethical point 
of view, but also from an economic one. Therefore, the case of Norway is considered to be 
a case that enhanced sustainability including from the perspectives of avoiding the 
“resource curse” and environmental injustice. In addition, Norway is a good example of 
preventing the leakage of benefits from natural resource development by foreign capital 
and enhancing the government's control over domestic oil and gas resources. 
 
 2) An examination of how the Alaskan SWF contributes to the sustainability of Alaska: 
What impacts did the Alaskan SWF have on the sustainability of Alaska? 
Alaska created their SWF, the APF, at the early stage of their oil and gas development to 
secure the public’s right to natural capitals in Alaska, especially because its developments 
take place in the area where most Native people live. The APF is the largest SWF among 
SWFs in any territorial entity, worth about 66 billion USD in 2019. The APF provides 
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annual dividends to Alaskan residents who are qualified to receive the dividend. These 
residents are entitled to the same dividend called a PFD. The dividend contributes to lower 
poverty in Alaska and boosts small businesses. Compared to Norway’s GPFG, Alaska's 
APF has a relatively low long-term stability but it is effective in building infrastructure 
which can be the basis for the development of future generations.  
 
Alaska’s experience with the SWF is a good SWF benchmark. The case of Alaska shows 
that sharing benefits from oil and gas resources with the public is important to ensure 
sustainability of society. Given the current high unemployment rate in Newfoundland and 
Labrador and the problem of the young people leaving the province, Alaska's case teaches 
NL how to use benefits from oil and gas resources. Whether Newfoundland and Labrador 
should share benefits in the form of direct dividends, like Alaska, is beyond the scope of 
this study, but Alaska's case suggests that benefit sharing with the public can be helpful to 
overcome the current bad economic situation and increase economic sustainability. This 
has allocated the benefits of consuming oil and gas resources in Alaska to those who have 
the property right of the resource, as well as lowered the poverty rate and activating the 
business. The discrepancy between who owns the property rights to the natural resources 
and who benefits from the resource wealth is one of the potential causes of the “resource 
curse” (Wenar, 2008). Therefore, Alaska's SWF can be referred to as an example of 
avoiding the “curse” of owning resources by returning fair benefits to the people with 




3) An examination of the impact of the oil and gas industry on the sustainability of 
Newfoundland and Labrador: How does the oil and gas industry affect Newfoundland and 
Labrador's sustainability and what improvements should be made?  
Although Newfoundland and Labrador's economic development has been dependent on the 
oil and gas industry in the recent decades, it has been pointed out that the province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador is not receiving a sufficient share from exploitation of its oil 
and gas resources in its own territory (Bazel & Mintz, 2019; Crisan & Mintz, 2017). 
Considering that the many companies operating offshore Newfoundland and Labrador are 
international companies that have their headquarters outside of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, this raises more property rights issues with the low resource rent. Their industrial 
activities are also exempted from carbon taxes, leaving them unaccountable for the 
environmental and social harm they produce for the local residents. In particular, the debt 
of the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador, which is currently at its 
highest level, shows that Newfoundland's economy is not only unsustainable but also in a 
dangerous situation. Thus, in its current state, the provincial government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador should make some policy decisions concerning the extraction and use of their 
oil and gas resources to move Newfoundland and Labrador onto a sustainable path. 
 
4) A review of the feasibility of the introduction of a SWF in Newfoundland and Labrador 
and identifying its challenges based on the case study results of Norway and Alaska: Will 
Newfoundland and Labrador be able to ensure sustainability like Norway and Alaska with 
their oil and gas revenue? 
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Should the province of Newfoundland and Labrador want to create a SWF, the government 
needs to deposit an average of $2,132 million (in 2018 prices) yearly for the next 20 years, 
which would require a royalty rate as high as that received from oil and gas extraction 
before the oil price crash in 2014. Considering the relatively high production cost of oil and 
gas in Newfoundland and Labrador, introducing the SWF may hinder new investments as 
scheduled under the “Way Forward” plan. The recent oil price volatility, however, also 
shows that Newfoundland and Labrador needs a financial vehicle that can absorb the 
economic shocks of oil price volatility.  
 
There are possible ways to secure enough funds for a sustainable SWF. Firstly, if the oil 
production doubles under the “Way Forward” plan, oil and gas companies will make more 
revenue. Second, royalties on natural gas production will be an alternative source of 
funding for the SWF as the province is preparing for the commercial production of natural 
gas. Third, the annual benefits from the federal government that will be given under the 
Atlantic Accord amended in 2019 could be another source for the Fund. And lastly, the NL 
mining industry that also consumes non-renewable resources may need to share the burden 
in the Alaska case, because the industry is also impacted by considerable sustainability 
concerns. However, the current provincial government has a considerable debt, so more 
research is needed on how much of this additional revenue should be used to establish the 




The findings of this study show that Newfoundland and Labrador residents have not 
received enough benefits from their own oil and gas resources, and a new royalty rate is 
needed to correct this situation and ensure the sustainability of development for 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Overall, Newfoundland and Labrador needs to introduce a 
SWF, but it needs to address some additional policy challenges. The first one is an effort 
to secure additional financial resources in addition to the oil revenue to support the 
proposed Fund. The second one is the need to reach social consensus on the introduction 
of the SWF. The third one is to work on a sustainable design and regulation of the Fund to 
compensate for the environmental degradation caused by the exploitation of non-renewable 
resources.  
 
Given the current low oil price and the relatively high production cost of oil and gas 
operations on the offshore Newfoundland and Labrador, it is a challenging time to 
introduce a SWF. However, the introduction of a SWF is recommended for the 
sustainability of Newfoundland and Labrador. Increasing the royalties may reduce the oil 
and gas industry's industrial activities or hinder new investments in oil and gas resources 
in the offshore Newfoundland and Labrador in the short-term. However, the lessons from 
the recent crises arising from the COVID-19 pandemic are that the era of small government 
is over and governments must have the capacity to actively respond to crises. A SWF is a 
way to achieve such capacity by using oil and gas revenue and acquire long-term 




The idea of the need for a SWF in Newfoundland and Labrador is not totally new. 
Palladini's study (2015), which identified areas where NL should improve to foster a 
competitive business environment and sustainable prosperity, also proposed to create a 
SWF to rely less on oil, and recommended a few lessons worth sharing within this study. 
Firstly, NL needs fiscal policies to “reduce reliance on annual oil revenue, such as SWF” 
(Palladini, 2015, p.8). Second, NL needs to “increase investment in public infrastructure 
and provide skills training” (Palladini, 2015, p.108). Last but not least, the government is 
responsible for “ensuring that future generations benefit from oil and gas resources in NL” 
(Palladini, 2015, p.108). These lessons confirm the validity of this study, and give 
guidelines on where NL should invest for sustainability. A report from the Atlantic Institute 
for Market Studies, which also asserted the need of SWFs in the Atlantic provinces of 
Canada, commented that  
“There is always an argument about why saving is not a viable option. When 
revenue falls, the excuse is poverty. When revenue rises, the excuse is the need to 
make up for past shortfalls or to “invest” in the future by increasing spending in the 
present” (Roach et al., 2015, p.7). 
Despite such arguments, proper saving from oil and gas revenue, like in the GPFP or APF, 
has brought success in building more sustainable societies. Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
economy has been dominated by the rise and fall of the oil and gas industry. The history of 
the economic recessions in Newfoundland and Labrador already gave lessons concerning 
the provincial government’s huge debt. Even if the economy is boosted in the short term 
due to the “Way Forward” plan, the productivity of resources will fall again in the long run, 
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and without proper policies, Newfoundland and Labrador will again face a cycle of collapse. 
It is time to build a new framework for oil and gas royalties especially because the economy 
is in a crisis and the provincial government is trying to ramp up the oil and gas production.  
 
 
7.2 Policy Recommendations 
 
Findings from this study have shown the expected benefits and challenges of introducing a 
SWF in Newfoundland and Labrador. These findings are under the hypothetical scenario 
that the province of Newfoundland and Labrador will introduce a SWF. However, the 
results of this study include general implications on how Newfoundland and Labrador can 
operate and manage its resource rent from oil and gas operations. The following policy 
recommendations are provided: 
1. Timing is important for oil and gas royalty reform. Both Norway and Alaska 
have designed policies to take proper royalty shares from the early stages of their 
resource development. Newfoundland and Labrador is no longer in an early stage 
of the development of their oil and gas resources, but this is a good time to introduce 
a SWF, now that the “Way Forward” plan is trying to significantly expand the oil 
and gas industry. 
2. Despite the urgency of the issue, there must be public consensus to establish a 
SWF. The Norwegian people have valued highly the equality and integrity of the 
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individual and this has inspired a range of legal provisions. Even in Norway, 
however, public dissatisfaction with the politics was observed when the GPFG was 
created, as the people wanted to see more changes and improvement in their current 
well-being, although the level of dissatisfaction was not significantly high (Listhaug, 
2005). Also, Alaskans had spent 4 years to discuss and vote on what they wanted to 
do with the benefits of oil and gas resources before creating the APF. Therefore, it 
is necessary to take time to build a social consensus about the need for a SWF. 
3. While greater savings is essential to continue making more annual returns and make 
the Fund sustainable, how to operate and regulate a SWF is crucial to maintain 
the fund sustainable. Considering that the provincial government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador is having financial difficulties and the oil industry 
alone is not enough to fund SWF, diversified sources of revenue saved and strict 
regulation of spending of the Fund are needed to create and maintain a SWF for 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  
4. Transparency is essential to manage SWFs. Both Norway and Alaska openly 
provide information about their SWFs, such as where the fund is being used, where 
it is being invested, and how much return was made. Regarding the third point, the 
public needs to know why they have to be patient.  
5. Build an economic structure that can benefit local people with property rights 
over their natural resources. It is important to save oil and gas revenues, but it is 
also important to keep the oil benefits from leaking out of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador economy. The current arrangements for managing the offshore oil and gas 
resources through C-NLOPB need to be revisited to better apply the provisions of 
153 
 
the Atlantic Accord, which ensure the Newfoundland and Labrador’s right to 
receive benefits from resource revenues. 
6. Invest in local human capital development. Human capital development is a way 
to avoid the “resource curse” as a result of revitalizing local industries and 
positively affecting regional economic development (Shao & Yang, 2014). Higher 





7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The following areas are in need of additional research in addition to the results of this study 
to make the recommendations of this study feasible. 
  
1) Studies on the natural gas industry  
The “Way Forward” plan includes a plan to initiate a framework for natural gas exploration 
and development as well as a plan to double its oil production by 2030. When natural gas 
production in Newfoundland and Labrador increases, this will be a potential good funding 
source for the SWF. Also, it is a relatively cleaner source of energy than other fossil fuel 
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products. Therefore, the utilization of natural gas will further enhance the feasibility of 
introducing a SWF, and further research will be needed on this area.  
 
2) Potential negative impacts of introducing a SWF in the oil and gas industry 
With the introduction of a SWF, the increase in oil royalties will increase production costs 
in the oil and gas industry, thus reducing industrial activity in the short term. This can be 
of significant concern 
 to the oil and gas industry and the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador 
especially because the provincial government is interested in boosting the economy through 
doubling oil and gas production in the province. In the long term, a SWF introduction is 
required, but further research is needed on the short-term negative effects that may occur 
in Newfoundland and Labrador to be prepared for such effects.   
 
3) Research on an effective royalty rate 
One of the most important steps in designing a SWF would be to set an effective royalty 
rate for the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. The royalty rate should be designed 
to minimize the negative effects mentioned above and to maximize the sustainability of the 
Newfoundland and Labrador economy and society. 
 
4) How to achieve consensus about the establishment of a SWF 
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Although the introduction of a SWF is intended to maximize the benefit of society in the 
long term, there may be people who want immediate benefits to the current generation from 
the oil and gas production, especially due to the recent economic contraction caused by 
Covid-19 and low oil prices. Thus, research is needed on how to make these people aware 
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